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ABSTRACT
Aspects of Biological Explanation
by
Derek Skillings
Advisor: Peter Godfrey-Smith
This dissertation is an evaluation of some strategies used for understanding the biological
world. It argues that the complexity of living systems challenges the adequacy of traditional
approaches to scientific explanation. An examination of the empirical details—especially those
at the microscopic and nano scales—highlights the limitations of mechanistic explanation,
common habits of causal reasoning, and theories of individuality. According to this analysis,
starting with broad generalizations of how the world is, or a single universal theory of how it
ought to be investigated or explained, has things entirely backwards. Instead, we ought to start by
looking at the important processes, relations, and interactions uncovered by the sciences,
carefully building towards general claims. In chapter one, I examine and challenge a dominant
characterization of mechanistic explanation. I develop an alternative approach that situates
biological processes as falling along a multidimensional gradient—with some processes being
paradigmatic cases of mechanisms and some being marginal cases. In chapter two I trace recent
developments in biology where the study of robustness has become increasingly important. I
develop a general taxonomy of robustness to help clarify links between the study of robustness in
different fields, and argue for a shift towards incorporating more top-down, system-level
approaches into general accounts of explanation. In chapter three I examine aspects of causal
reasoning in biology. I provide a novel distinction between two types of difficulties encountered
while reasoning about biological systems. In the face of these problems I argue that approaches
to explanation are best seen as heuristics, which focuses our attention on both how our
conceptual tools resolve problems, and when and where they can break down. In the final
chapter I turn to a debate at the interface of philosophy and biology about whether we need to
reevaluate our understanding of the biological world because we—along with every other
multicellular organism—are, and always have been, multispecies entities.
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INTRODUCTION
i. Overview
Scientific explanation is one of the core issues in contemporary philosophy of science.
Early philosophical accounts of explanation tend to emphasize conformance with laws and focus
on the success of physics. The shortcomings of purely law-based accounts of explanation began
to be realized when philosophers started paying attention to explanatory practice in biology.
Much of the philosophical literature on explanation in biology falls within the causal and
mechanistic traditions, and these approaches serve as both starting points and foils in my
dissertation.
The explosion of progress in biophysics, molecular biology and genetics in the last few
decades has painted a new picture of the inner workings of the living world and opened up new
explanatory challenges. For example: How should we describe the causal relations of reliable
processes that are driven by stochastic forces? What is the causal relation between a gene and a
phenotype when the mechanism of gene expression is a robust network of pathways, few of
which, if any, are independently necessary for the mechanism to function? How should we think
of organisms given revelations about the ubiquity and interdependency of host-microbial
interactions? In short, how should we explain the peculiar organizational and causal structures of
the biological world?
My dissertation is organized as a series of philosophical problems arising from a close
examination of the details of biological systems. A unifying theme of this project is a
demonstration of how paying close attention to scientific details can transform philosophical
problems. Each chapter focuses on particularly challenging aspects of biological systems, how
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scientists have tackled these challenges when constructing theories or explanations, and the
resulting problems posed for philosophical treatments of the relevant issue along with a strategy
proposed to help overcome those problems. This order of analysis is intentional, as well as
central to how I think the philosophy of science should be approached.
I maintain that starting with broad generalizations of how the world is, or a single theory
of how it ought to be analyzed or investigated has the process entirely backwards. We shouldn’t
assume at the outset that there is an interesting unified category to be found. Instead we ought to
start by looking at the important processes, relations, and interactions uncovered by the sciences
to see if we can build up to generalities. Generality is a very important aim for science and
philosophy of science. But I am convinced that we must carefully build towards general claims,
rather than assuming them in the first place. Thus, the strategy that I pursue in my dissertation is
to start by examining the details turned up by biological investigation, rather than offering from
the start general claims that are supposed to hold for all biological explanation. We can then try
to determine whether such general claims might emerge from the biological particulars.1

ii. Chapter Overviews
Biologists tend not to cite, nor search for, laws of nature in their explanations, and
biological phenomena do not fall into regular, law-like patterns. “At least in biology, most
scientists see their work as explaining types of phenomena by discovering mechanisms…”
(Wimsatt 1972). In chapter one, I characterize a basic account of mechanistic explanation pulled
from the philosophical literature. I present three challenges to this account using examples from
molecular biology and biophysics. I argue that the basic mechanistic account is (1) insufficient
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See (Pradeu 2012; Guay and Pradeu 2016) for the advocation of a similar approach.
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for explaining non-sequential and nonlinear dynamic processes, is (2) insufficient for explaining
the inherently stochastic nature of many biological mechanisms, and (3) fails to give a proper
framework for analyzing organization. I argue that biological processes are best approached as a
multidimensional gradient—with some processes being paradigmatic cases of mechanisms and
some being marginal cases. I then suggest three axes along which mechanisms vary within this
gradient: isolability, organization, and sequentiality.
One striking feature of many biological systems is their high degree of robustness, or the
ability of a system to maintain its function or behavior against perturbations and under a wide
range of circumstances. Despite the ubiquity and importance of robustness, philosophers tend to
think of it in a simple way. In chapter two I trace recent developments in two fields of biology
where the study of robustness has become increasingly important: ecology and evo-devo. I argue
for a shift towards incorporating more top-down, system-level approaches into accounts of
explanation to better reflect scientific practice seen in those two fields. I develop a general
taxonomy of robustness to help clarify links between the study of robustness in different fields. I
define three general kinds of robustness: redundancy, resistance and resilience. Each of these
categories are further subdivided in turn.
In chapter three I examine aspects of causal reasoning in biology. In my analysis, I
provide a novel distinction between two types of difficulties encountered while reasoning about
biological systems. First, there is a difficulty with imagining and predicting the behaviour of
biological phenomena—especially across scales or domains--that stems from the stochastic and
contingent nature of many biological processes. I refer to this as the translation problem. For
example, reasoning about the emerging behavior of higher-level biological phenomena from
lower-level phenomena can be difficult because the intracellular stochastically-driven biological
3

processes that make up the building blocks of life behave in a way that is alien to our everyday
reasoning about the behavior of objects at our scale. Second, there is a difficulty with identifying
all the numerous salient causal factors and interactions behind the production of biological
phenomena. I call this the interpretation problem. It stems from the difficulty in decomposing
the unique causal complexity that is found in robust, hierarchical and recursively organized
biological systems2. In the face of these problems I argue that approaches to explanation are best
seen as heuristics, which focuses our attention on both how our conceptual tools resolve
problems, and when and where they can break down.
In the final chapter I turn to a debate at the interface of philosophy and biology about
whether we need to reevaluate our understanding of the biological world because we—along
with nearly every other multicellular organism—are, and always have been, multispecies entities.
It is now widely accepted that microorganisms play many important roles in the lives of plants
and animals. Every macroorganism has been shaped in some way by microorganisms. The
recognition of the ubiquity and importance of microorganisms has led some to argue for a
revolution in how we understand biological individuality and the primary units of natural
selection. The term “holobiont” was introduced as a name for the biological unit made up by a
host and all of its associated microorganisms, and much of this new debate about biological
individuality has focused on whether holobionts are integrated individuals or communities. I
show how parts of the holobiont can span both characterizations. I argue that most holobionts
share more affinities with communities than they do with organisms, and that, except for maybe
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This problem, under various guises, has been noted and discussed by biologists for decades. For
example, See Lewontin (1974, 1978) for extensive discussions about the epistemological
difficulties in isolating and describing the evolutionarily significant genetic variation that
explains change in a trait of interest.
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in rare cases, holobionts do not meet the criteria for being organisms, evolutionary individuals,
or units of selection.
The goal of the rest of this introduction is to briefly sketch out some general debates
within the topic of scientific explanation in order to both situate and motivate the problems I take
on in my dissertation.

iii. Three Contexts of Explanation
The term ‘explanation’ is used in three slightly different contexts in the philosophical
literature, and accounts of explanation generally take one of these three as the fundamental
context by which we can evaluate explanations. Sometimes, ‘explanation’ refers to a
communicative act: explanations are a means of communicating scientific knowledge. Accounts
that take this context as fundamental are pragmatic, and evaluate explanations by how well they
convey understanding, (i.e., Bromberger 1965; van Fraassen 1980; Achinstein 1983).
‘Explanation’ might also refer to the facts about the world that are cited in an explanatory
communicative act, such as the relevant laws, causes, and things out in the world. Accounts that
take this context as fundamental evaluate explanations by whether or not they get the facts right,
(i.e., Salmon 1970; Railton 1981; Salmon 1984; Lewis 1986; Woodward 2003; Craver 2007;
Strevens 2008). Finally, ‘explanation’ might refer to the representational form that explanations
take. Those that take representational form as fundamental to explanation evaluate explanations
by whether or not they are adequate representations, (i.e., Hempel 1965; Kitcher 1981;
Machamer et al. 2000). To a large extent, these three approaches to explanation—referred to
respectively as pragmatic, ontic, and representational—are taken to be at odds with each other.

5

iv. A Brief History of the Philosophy of Scientific Explanation
The earliest account of something approaching explanation is usually agreed to be set out
by Aristotle’s account of causes in his Physics. Aristotle’s account of causes set the agenda in
Europe for the scholarly understanding of the natural world until the beginning of the 17th
century (Schmaltz 2011). ‘[T]he search for causes of events in nature’ that ‘guided science from
the time of Aristotle’ was superseded at ‘the dawn of modern science’, starting with the work of
Galileo, ‘by a quest for laws of nature based on experiment and measurement’ (Drake 1981: ix).
It was during this time in the early modern period that various mechanical philosophies
began to be developed. Mechanical philosophy is usually associated with a reductive theory of
matter. The parts of matter are defined by geometrical properties and move according to
universal and mathematically-described laws of motion. All physical phenomena can be
explained in terms of matter and motion. The mechanical philosophers had a problem in that the
motions of corpuscular matter occur an unobservable level. Thus, scientific explanation
consisted in forms of explanations where the geometrical properties and mathematical laws that
hold of observable everyday phenomena, physics, are transferred, by analogy to those
unobservable phenomena (Hattab 2001). The ultimate goal of scientific explanation was the
mathematical demonstration of the phenomena in question (Hattab 2001, Schmaltz 2011).
The proponents of this kind of view of the world included Descartes, More, Leibniz,
Boyle, Hooke, Gassendi, Digby, Hobbes, Locke, and more. Henry More was the first to use the
term, but Robert Boyle popularized it, and Descartes is probably most closely associated with it,
especially as it was applied to a new understanding of the workings of organisms (Hattab 2001).
The early moderns, for the most part, rejected an Aristotelian conception of biological
phenomena where generation, growth, nutrition, and locomotion are attributed to final causes,
6

and the activity of the vegetative and sensitive souls (Smith 2011) .
Descartes further pushed the application of mathematical and geometrical descriptions to
nature when he identified nature as a divinely fashioned machine, stating that there is no
difference in kind between the parts of nature and machines designed by humans, only a
difference in degree (Hattab 2011, Smith 2011, Nicholson 2013). Living things are not merely
like machines, they are really are just more complex machines. Descartes wrote in a letter to
Morin: ‘I know that you will say that the form of the clock is only an artificial form, while the
form of the sun is natural and substantial; but I reply that this distinction concerns only the cause
of these forms, and not at all their nature…’. He then claims that ‘there is no essential difference’
but only one of degree between them (translations quoted from Hattab 2011).
The idea of treating the working of organisms as analogous the workings of machines
was not new to this period. Such a tradition goes all the way back to ancient Greece (Nicholson
2013). What was new was the conviction that it is not only useful, under certain circumstances,
to treat organisms as if they are machines, but that we can only truly understand organisms if we
conceive of them as machines (Nicholson 2013). A mechanical philosophy is thus able to bring
together the animate and inanimate parts of the natural world (save the ensouled human), under
one explanatory framework.
It is important to note that machines of the time were not just the well-known clock-work
contraptions. The early moderns had a fairly sophisticated account of machines and organisms.
Machines of that time also ran on air and water hydraulics, chemical and thermal processes. As
characterized in a quote that I particularly like: “In short, a fermenting, exploding, end‐directed
machine of quasi‐perpetual motion is a far cry from the sort of gear-driven contraption that
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mechanical philosophers are supposed to have taken animals to be” (Smith 2011). But it was this
complexity that also led to the demise, albight temporarily, of the mechanical framework for the
understanding of organisms. A search for vital principles and vital forces dominated
philosophical accounts of the organism until the 19th century, finally coming to an end in the
early 20th century.
An approach to scientific explanation that also developed in the early modern period—
and was perhaps ultimately more successful—was a shift to a view of the natural world based
upon universal laws. The use of laws in early modern physics is, at least in part, explained by the
increasing importance of ‘mathematical principles’ in the work of Descartes, Newton and others.
Schmaltz (2011) traces the major moves in this history in the following way. Descartes,
deviating from past scholastic practice, made laws central to his account of physics. Descartes
did not contrast causes and laws, rather, he identified laws as the secondary causes of changes in
motion that are ground in the internal features of bodies. The second major step was made by
Malebranche, who took causality out of the material world and placed it in God. Causes were
identified as God’s efficacious volitions. The progression culminated in Berkeley’s view
(following Newton’s work in physics) that the laws of physics are to be identified with
mathematical principles that do not concern real causes of motion. At this point then, explanation
in terms of scientific laws is a subsumption of particular events under inductive generalizations,
as opposed to the illumination of causal structures (Schmaltz 2011). Scientific explanation
characterized by the search for laws dominated until the mid-20th century when it came to be
supplemented by a return to causal explanations.
The earliest contemporary philosophical accounts of explanation in science, such as
(Hempel 1965), were one-size-fits-all approaches that tended to emphasize laws and focus on the
8

success of physics. These accounts were soon seen to be problematic, and later largely
abandoned, for two reasons. The first reason came from actual explanatory practice in the special
sciences. Exceptions to law-based accounts of explanation became common when philosophers
started paying attention to fields such as biology. Biologists tend not to cite, nor search for, laws
of nature in their explanations, and biological phenomena do not fall into regular, law-like
patterns3.
The second, and perhaps more decisive, reason for the abandonment of law-based
accounts is that they aren’t able to account for the apparent asymmetry of explanations. For
example, given information about the angle of the sun and some basic knowledge of
trigonometry one can derive the length of a flagpole’s shadow from the height of the flagpole.
Symmetrically, one can also derive the height of the flagpole from the length of the shadow. But
it is the height of the flagpole that explains the length of the shadow, and not the length of the
shadow that explains the height of the flagpole4.
Following the increasing disfavor for law-based views of explanation, causation once
again started to become central to most accounts of scientific explanation. Two questions have
been historically central to understanding causation, and they still feature prominently in modern
work on causal explanation. The first question is most commonly traced back to the works of J.S.
Mill (Mill 1882). Among all of the factors that were necessary for the occurrence of some
phenomena, which should be selectively highlighted as the cause/s in an explanation of that

3

A notable exception is ecology. Ecologists search for laws, but have so far come to little
agreement on whether there are any.
4
The famous flagpole counter-example to Hempel’s deductive model was introduced in Sylvain
Bromberger’s unpublished dissertation (Bromberger 1961). It was more widely disseminated
through a more accessible description in Salmon (1971: 71-76).
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phenomena, and which should be omitted or relegated to the level of background conditions?
Call this the selection problem. The second question finds its roots in the works of David Hume.
What is the relationship between explanations of singular events and explanations of
regularities? Call this the generalization problem.

v. The Selection Problem
On very few accounts does the requirement to pick out the causes which brought about an
event extend to all, or even very many, of the causal influences of that event. Namely, a good
causal explanation only requires that we pick out the important causal influences. With these
causal influences in hand there are two further types of causal selection that are often important
in explanation: selecting the right ‘level of explanation’ and the prioritization of some causes
through the omission of background conditions.
Selecting the right ‘level of explanation’ is often thought to be fairly straightforward.5
The correct level of explanation is given by the level of what is to be explained. That level tends
to be at the same level as the explanatory target, or one level down at the level of the parts or
events making up the explanatory target. An explanation might be inadequate, or even fail as an
explanation at all, if it is given at the wrong level given the explanatory target. For example, an
explanation might be bad if it gives too many irrelevant low-level details. We don’t--and
currently couldn’t--give an explanation of the rising of bread dough by giving micro-scale
descriptions at the atomic level. The location and movement of every molecule, or even every
yeast and wheat cell, is not necessary. It may even impede understanding. In most contexts we
give explanations in terms of flour, water, yeast, salt and fermentation by-products.

5

Being able to give a rigorous account of how this is to be done is much more elusive.
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An explanation might also be inadequate because it is at too high of a level, such as when
a mechanism is black-boxed. This level of explanation fails to reveal important explanatory
details. For example, an account that just includes the fact that gas bubbles form in the dough
and that those bubbles cause it to rise is inadequate. It doesn’t explain how the bubbles form and
makes no mention of yeast, fermentation, etc. Neither the too-high level nor the too-low level
account are giving false information, they just appear to be missing the details that are relevant to
the phenomena we are trying to explain.
When giving an explanation for the occurrence of an event we rarely cite all of the
conditions, or causal factors, that were necessary for bringing about that event. Instead, we pick
out a few, often just one, causal factors to give special priority, and relegate all the rest to the
status of background or enabling conditions. We might say that it was the yeast that caused the
bread dough to rise. Of course, we also know that, among other things, the yeast required water
and nutrients, in the form of flour, to produce the gaseous byproducts that led to the rising of the
bread dough. In contrast to selecting the right ‘level of explanation’, the decision about which
causes to select as salient, and which causes to relegate through omission to ‘background
factors’, is usually taken to be a purely pragmatic matter. This is the view that Mill took (1882:
book 3, chapter 5). Many other prominent accounts of causal explanation take a similar stance in
denying that there is any uninquely correct pragmatics of explanation (Railton 1981; Lewis
1986; Hall 2004; Strevens 2008).

vi. The Generality Problem
There are two types of targets for causal explanations: singular events and regularities.
Likewise, there are two types of explanations corresponding to these two targets. Singular
explanations are aimed at explaining singular events, such as the browning of a particular loaf of
11

bread in a particular oven at a particular time, and singular states of affairs, such as an oven
being hot in a particular kitchen at a particular time. General explanations are aimed at
explaining regularities, such as physical laws, theories, mechanisms or dispositional properties.
Claims about the relations between singular events and regularities usually stem from
discussions about the nature of causation. For Hume, the truth of singular causal claims depends
upon the existence of universal regularities. He writes: “[W]e may define a cause to be an object,
followed by another, and where all the objects similar to the first, are followed by objects similar
to the second”. (Hume 1748: Sec. VII). We only say that throwing the rock caused the window to
break, because of the regular association between rocks hitting windows and windows breaking.
Regularity and causation are tied tightly together.
I will leave to the side questions about the order of precedence between singular causal
claims and regularities. That is, whether singular causal events account for regularity, or whether
we only attribute causation in singular events because of the observance of regularity. I will also
be largely bracketing other questions about the metaphysics of causation. The discussion that
follows is meant to apply no matter what the causal relation underlying causal explanation might
be, e.g., regularity, Lewisian or interventionist counterfactuals, transference of a conserved
quantity, probabilistic, etc.

vii. A Brief Survey of Causal Explanatory Accounts
Now that we have the problems that concern a causal account of scientific explanation on
table, I will introduce some theories of causal explanation. This is not meant to be a
comprehensive review. I offer a few accounts that best highlight the diversity of approaches in
the literature.
12

vii.a Minimalist Accounts of Causal Explanation
The rise of contemporary causal approaches to explanation started with “minimalist
accounts” like those of Railton (1981) and Salmon (1984). On Railton’s account, the universe is
a vast weave of causal influence, and for any given event it is the causes of that event which
explain its occurrence. The explanatory targets are fundamental concrete events and every causal
influencer must be cited in the explanation. An explanation requires all of the fine-grained details
leading up to the target phenomena. In minimalist accounts, the gravitational pull of Saturn is a
part of the explanation for the rising of bread dough. Given what we know about physical forces
and the fact that gravity and electromagnetic forces never drop to absolute zero, everything in an
event’s past light-cone is a possible cause of that event. Railton uses the term ‘ideal text’ to refer
to the full explanation of an event. Needless to say, we never have full explanations for events.
The explanations that we give each other, and that scientists present in journals, are always
partial. The selection of which causes we foreground in a partial explanation and at which level
we explain is governed by pragmatics, convention, or norms of communication, not by any
criteria for getting the explanation “right”.

vii.b Difference-Maker Accounts of Causal Explanation
An account that requires the inclusion of every causal influence is neither useful nor
satisfactory. It is, at best, a conceptual starting point for a richer theory of explanation. So we ask
the question most commonly traced back to the works of J.S. Mill (1882): among all of the
factors that were necessary for the occurrence of some phenomena, which should be selectively
highlighted as the cause(s) in an explanation of that phenomena, and which should be omitted or
relegated to the level of background conditions? More recent causal approaches to explanation
tend to take only those causal influences that are difference-makers to be explanatory. To
13

understand a phenomenon is to see what made a difference to the causal production of the
phenomenon and how it did so (Strevens 2008). Or as Jim Woodward (2010) puts it “…good
explanations should both include information about all factors which are such that changes in
them are associated with some change in the explanandum-outcome of interest and not include
factors such that no changes in them are associated with changes in the explanandum-outcome.”
I will distinguish between those causal influences that are difference-makers and those
that are not by returning to my imaginary kitchen. While making a cake I drop an egg, it hits the
hardwood floor and breaks. I want to explain why the egg broke. There are many causal
influences on the breaking of the egg, among them are the hitting of the floor and the orientation
of the egg as it leaves my hand. Only the floor makes a difference to the breaking, even though
both affect exactly how the egg breaks. The orientation of the egg when it leaves my hand will
influence where the egg first makes contact with the floor and how the force is transmitted
through the egg. It will almost certainly affect the precise pattern of cracking and the trajectory
of the splatter. However, these influences do not determine whether or not the egg breaks. They
make a difference to the way that the egg breaks, but not to whether or not it breaks at all.
Relative to the explanatory target of whether or not the egg breaks, the impact with the floor
explains the breaking, the orientation of the egg on impact does not.
Difference-making accounts are aimed at higher-level events, rather than at fundamental
concrete events. Fundamental concrete events include every single causal detail about an event.
Any difference in the causal details, like a few molecules being switched around, makes for a
different concrete event. The concrete event of the egg’s breaking when I dropped it would not
have occurred if anything at all had been different. If the orientation of the egg had been
different, than a different concrete breaking event would have happened instead. This is because
14

all causal influencers are difference-makers for concrete events. Only when we abstract to the
higher-level of that particular egg breaking at all do some causal influencers become difference
makers.
There are a wide variety of criteria for picking out difference makers. Many of these
criteria are the same ones used for picking out causal relations. There are counterfactual tests: a
causal influence is a difference-maker for an event if, had the influence been absent, the event
would not have occurred. There are probabilistic tests: a causal influence is a difference-maker
only if the probability of the event occurring is higher when the influence is present than when it
is not. I will look at one recent account for picking out difference-makers: Michael Streven’s
(2008) Kairetic account.
The kairetic procedure for building an explanation begins by building a model structured
as a deductive derivation representing all of the causal influences that causally entail the event to
be explained. Remove as many of the causal influences as you can from the model without
invalidating the entailment. Next make the causal model as abstract as possible, by replacing the
fine-grained details of the influences with more abstract descriptions of the same. Abstract to the
point where any further abstraction would invalidate the entailment of the target event. You now
have all the difference-makers for the event selected at the right level of explanation.
Strevens supplements the kairetic procedure with ‘frameworks’ in order to offer a
complete account of explanatory practice. Something like a ‘framework’, or a ceteris paribus
clause, is found in most difference-maker accounts. A framework specifies some set of
conditions that is held fixed in an explanation. The framework is part of an explanatory request,
and can be given either implicitly or explicitly. An explanation for an event that includes a
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framework is not an explanation for that event in its totality, but rather an explanation for that
event given whatever the framework specifies. For example, the request for an explanation of
why the egg broke is not a request for why the egg broke—full stop—it is a request for why the
egg broke given the effects of gravity, that we are not underwater, that the eggshell has not been
artificially hardened, etc.
That gives us an answer to the selection problem, but what about the generality problem?
The kairetic account shares the form of this answer with other difference-maker accounts of
causal explanation. The explanation of a causal regularity and the explanation of any instance of
that regularity invoke the same causal process. Strevens (2008) calls this the “first fundamental
theorem of causal-mechanical explanation”. The causal facts that explain any instance of a
regularity can be used, in addition, to explain the regularity itself. In terms of the kairetic
account, generalizations constitute a model schema for the explanation of any instance of that
generalization. The explanation of an instance of a generalization comprises the explanation of
the generalization together with the specifics of the instantiation, such as the filling in of
variables within the schema with the particular values of the event. General explanations and
singular explanations are produced by the same procedure; they are just at different levels of
abstraction and have different explanatory targets.

vii.c Mechanistic Explanation
Explanation in the special sciences usually takes the form of isolating a regular
phenomenon in nature and then providing the mechanism that accounts for that regularity
(Wimsatt 1972). The most widely cited philosophical account of mechanisms defines them as
follows: “Mechanisms are entities and activities organized such that they are productive of
regular changes from start or set-up to finish or termination conditions” (Machamer et al. 2000).
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The first feature of mechanisms is that they are hierarchically structured and can be broken down
into components. The second important feature of a mechanism is that the entities in a
mechanism must be appropriately located, structured, and oriented, and the activities in which
they engage must have a temporal order, rate, and duration (Bechtel and Richardson 1993;
Machamer et al. 2000). The organization of entities and activities determines the ways in which
they are able to co-produce phenomena. Finally, the entities and activities constituting the
mechanism must work in a regular fashion. A mechanism regularly produces or gives rise to the
same phenomenon because earlier stages lead reliably to final stages, so that different instances
of a mechanism share patterns of activity among similar or identical entities (Andersen 2012).
Mechanistic explanations are primarily used to pick out the structure of processes that are
responsible for producing higher-level regularities. In many ways mechanistic explanation is a
refinement of the causal explanation that we saw above set to a particular task, the explanation of
regularities. Mechanistic explanations tend to focus on the structure of the whole causal process
rather than the nature of the relations between individual events in the process. Though it might
not be necessary to underlie a mechanistic account with a difference-maker account, most seem
to have one in mind.

viii. Towards a More Nuanced Account of Explanation
The survey of explanatory accounts that I just presented reads as a build-up of
explanatory desiderata. This is intentional, and to some extent tracks the 20th century history of
philosophical accounts of explanation. The transition between causal explanatory “genres” rests
upon a debate about what a complete explanation looks like in an ideal case. For the minimalist
account, a complete causal explanation consists of all the microphysical details of causal
influencers of the event to be explained. Someone subscribing to a difference-maker won’t be
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satisfied with the minimalist account. It’s not that the minimalist explanation is wrong about the
facts, it’s just that it is missing some information. In addition to knowing all of the causal
influencers, this person also wants to know which of these influencers are difference-makers in
regards to the explanandum. The minimalist explanation needs to be supplemented in order for it
to be an adequate explanation. If we have all the causal facts that are contained in a minimalist
explanation, then we have all the causal facts necessary to generate a difference-maker
explanation. An adequate explanation requires that we make difference-making causal influences
explicit.
I see a similar tension between the difference-maker accounts and the mechanistic
accounts. Again, it’s not that a difference-maker explanation is wrong about the facts, it’s just
that it is missing some information. The mechanist is interested in explaining regularities. In
addition to knowing about the difference-making parts in the causal chain leading to the
explanandum, the mechanist wants to know which structural relations in that causal chain are
important for reliably producing the explanandum6. When we are trying to explain regular
phenomena that are produced by causal processes, the difference-maker explanation needs to be
supplemented with mechanisms details in order to be considered explanatorily adequate.
It is almost certainly not the case that we will always be able to build a complete
mechanistic explanation out of a complete explanation made up only of difference-makers. This
is because a complete mechanistic explanation requires that we make the structure of the
mechanism explicit in addition to picking out the difference-makers. In some cases, that

6

This line of argument I take to be similar to the one used to justify asymptotic explanations by
Batterman (2002).
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information might be retrievable from the complete difference-maker explanation. In cases
where the mechanism contains redundant or back-up processes, these non-difference makers
might have been left out of the difference-maker explanation.
I will be pushing this explanatory expansionist line further, and doing so guided by the
biology of systems that have received very little attention in philosophy. One important
consequence of my analysis is that it reveals how biologists have adapted their explanatory
practices, and shows how explanation is more diverse than mainstream philosophical accounts
suggest. Paying close attention to the behavior, complexity, and organization of causal processes
in living systems, and their differences from other systems, motivates further revisions to the
received views of scientific explanation. The available mechanistic and difference-maker
accounts of explanation have enriched our explanatory reach, but they fall short in their goal of
adequately explaining all types of causal phenomena. Guided by the biology—by the details of
how living systems actually work—I show how important features like stochasticity, robustness
and recursive hierarchical organization are not accommodated by dominant accounts of
explanation.
A final comment in anticipation of responses to what I have said in this section. The
transition between causal explanatory accounts through the addition of explanatory criteria is
supposed to be motivated by finding the more minimal account unsatisfactory. When faced with
an argument for the centrality of difference-makers, the minimalist might counter that, while
they can see the pragmatic value of highlighting difference-makers, they see no reason to think
that only the difference-makers are explanatory. After all, the difference-makers are included in
the set of causal influences, so the minimalist explanation isn’t missing anything at all. Similarly,
when faced with an argument for the importance of picking out mechanisms over-and-above the
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difference-makers, the difference-maker adherent might counter by claiming that the additional
explanatory requirement is redundant once you have the set of causal processes that instantiate
the purported mechanism. I expect a similar reply could be made in response to the addition of
the explanatory criteria I will suggest over the course of my dissertation.
I don’t think there are any decisive arguments against these replies. The defender of the
more extended account might try to further motivate the critic by an appeal to usefulness,
predictive power, or a shared search for the most explicit account of our explanatory practice.
There are good reasons to value the more extended accounts that are based on actual explanatory
practice in science. There is also a long tradition—and a strong intuition—that says the
gravitational pull of the distant stars is explanatory irrelevant to the explanation of the breaking
of an egg. Beyond this, the most that someone offering a more extensive list of explanatory
requirements might hope for is to have others see, as they do, the explanatory force behind their
answers to questions about why things are the way they are.
With this thought in mind, I can now begin my project, showing how the details of the
biological world motivates an expansion in our approaches to explanation, a revision of our
everyday causal reasoning habits, and an appreciation of ourselves as communities.
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CHAPTER 1: Mechanistic Explanation of Biological
Processes7
1.1 Introduction
The biological world is dynamic and evolving. One of its most prominent features is
change, whether that change is an oscillating cell in homeostatic equilibrium, a developing
multicellular organism, an evolving lineage, or seasonal ecosystem cycling. For much of biology
providing a satisfactory explanation for a particular change means providing the mechanism that
accounts for the phenomenon in question. A substantial amount of recent work in the philosophy
of biology has been directed towards offering analyses of mechanisms and mechanistic
explanation. Levy (2013) argues that this explosion of activity has led to mechanistic talk being
adopted by three closely related, but often not well distinguished, projects (see Nicholson 2012
for a historical division of mechanistic views). The first project provides a mechanistic account
of causation. It is the view that causal relations between non-fundamental physical phenomena
exist in virtue of underlying mechanisms. The second project is concerned with explanation. A
mechanistic view of explanation holds that certain types of phenomena, e.g. biological
phenomena, are explained by identifying the mechanisms generating those phenomena, i.e. by
specifying the underlying parts, their organization and their interactions. The third project is
about how phenomena are best modeled. Levy (2013) uses the label “strategic mechanism” for
the thesis that certain phenomena are most readily understood when modeled abstractly as
mechanisms. This chapter is concerned with the mechanisms—and their underlying components-identified by the explanations in the second project, as well as the target systems to be modeled

7

This chapter was published in a slightly modified form as: Skillings DJ. 2015. Mechanistic
Explanation of Biological Processes. Philosophy of Science. 82:1139-1151.
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in a type three project. That is, I will primarily be focused on the entities underlying a
phenomenon rather than the representation of those entities in a model of that phenomenon. I
will leave to the side the discussion of the nature of causal relations, as it is, at best, tangential to
my goals.
In this paper I will characterize a basic account of mechanistic explanation by presenting
a recent and prominent approach in the philosophy of biology, almost universally referred to as
the “new mechanist” approach (Section 2). I will highlight tensions between this basic approach
and approaches that emphasize the non-sequential and stochastic character of some biological
phenomena. Examples from recent research in molecular biology will be used to illustrate this
point (Section 3). I will suggest that the best way to categorize the diversity seen across putative
mechanisms is to view it as a multi-dimensional gradient--with some entities being clear cases of
paradigm mechanisms and some entities being marginal cases--as opposed to being made up of
discrete categories. I propose that this is accomplished by situating processes of interest within a
multi-dimensional space generated by the interaction of three features: isolability, organization
and sequentiality (Section 4). My overall goal is not to dispense entirely with the basic new
mechanist approach, but rather to find ways to extend the account so that it is adequate for
handling the full diversity of biological processes that are putative mechanisms.

1.2 Mechanisms
The most widely cited philosophical account of mechanisms defines them as follows:
“Mechanisms are entities and activities organized such that they are productive of regular
changes from start or set-up to finish or termination conditions” (Machamer et al. 2000, hereafter
MDC). Other prominent accounts also define mechanisms by decomposing them in terms of
parts and their activities or interactions: “…a mechanism is construed as generating a
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phenomenon through a start-to-finish sequence of qualitatively characterized operations
performed by component parts” (Bechtel and Richardson 1993; Bechtel 2011); “A mechanism
for a behavior is a complex system that produces that behavior by the interaction of a number of
parts, where the interactions between parts can be characterized by direct, invariant, changerelating generalizations” (Glennan 1996, 2002).
These three accounts serve as core examples of what is commonly called the new
mechanist approach. Glennan focuses on parts, their properties, and their interactions. An
interaction is just a change in the property of one or more parts that brings about a change in the
property of another part. The ability to produce change is a feature of entities. MDC have an
expanded ontology: entities don’t just interact, they engage in activities. Activities exist
independently of entities on this account (Machamer et al. 2000; Glennan 2002; Illari and
Williamson 2012, 2013). Activities are the producers of change, and entities are the things (with
their properties) that engage in activities (Machamer et al. 2000). An important feature of
activities is that they only exist extended in time, unlike entities, which can be extended in time
but need not be. Bechtel and Richardson (1993) emphasize how scientists decompose
mechanisms structurally into their parts and functionally into their operations. They emphasize
the same distinctions as MDC (entities/parts and activities/operations) but prefer the terminology
of parts operating on each in order to highlight the direct involvement and multiple roles of parts,
and are wary of making any metaphysical commitments. With these differences in mind, I will
use the terms basic mechanism and basic mechanistic account to refer to a mechanism as
outlined by the MDC account.
It will be helpful at this point to highlight with examples the features of a basic
mechanism. The first feature of mechanisms is that they are hierarchically structured and can be
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broken down into components. The second important feature of a basic mechanism is that the
entities in a mechanism must be appropriately located, structured, and oriented, and the activities
in which they engage must have a temporal order, rate, and duration (Machamer et al. 2000).
Activities connect entities into a coherent process. The organization of entities and activities
determines the ways in which they are able to co-produce phenomena. For example, a
neurotransmitter (entity) and a receptor (entity) bind (an activity) by virtue of their structural
properties and charge distributions. Similarly, a DNA base (entity) and a complementary DNA
base (entity) hydrogen-bond (activity) because of their geometric structures and weak charges.
Finally, the entities and activities constituting the mechanism must work in a regular fashion. A
mechanism regularly produces or gives rise to the same phenomenon because earlier stages lead
reliably to final stages, so that different instances of a mechanism share patterns of activity
among similar or identical entities (Andersen 2012). What makes a mechanism regular is the
productive continuity between stages (Machamer et al. 2000). Discontinuities are one way to
mark the bounds of mechanisms8.
An example of a basic mechanism comes from the text book description of the
mechanism for protein synthesis in prokaryotes. At its simplest, the protein synthesis mechanism
is a process in which many small entities, amino acids, are joined together by a ribosome to form
a larger entity, a protein [figure 1.1 and the description that follows based on Moore (2012)]. The
initiation of protein synthesis begins with the recruitment of ribosomal subunits from the cellular
pool by initiation factors. The small ribosomal subunit then binds to an appropriately aligned
mRNA and an fMet tRNA. Initiation ends when the second amino acid in the protein sequence is

8

Discontinuities can themselves be thought of in terms of strong modularity, in the (Woodward
2003) sense of modularity. See Section 1.3.3 for a further discussion of modularity.
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carried to the ribosomal complex by a tRNA. Elongation of the polypeptide then ensues in a
cyclical fashion. During elongation, a tRNA carrying an amino acid binds to the ribosome in
what is called the A site. The ribosomal complex moves the tRNA from the A site into the P site,
and another tRNA carrying the n+1 amino acid moves into the A site. Within the P site the
ribosome then transfers the amino acid from the tRNA onto the end of the growing protein in a
process called peptidyl transfer. At this point the ribosome must be reinitialized before the next
amino acid can be added to the nascent protein. During this process, which is called
translocation, the amino acid-less tRNA in the P site leaves the ribosome, the n+1 tRNA in the A
site moves to the P site, and the ribosome moves along its mRNA in the 3’ direction by one
codon. When the translating ribosome encounters a stop codon in the mRNA, the protein is
released from the ribosome and the two ribosomal subunits return to the cellular pool. This
process is called termination.

Figure 1.1 Protein synthesis cycle based on illustration found in Moore (2012).
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1.3 Criticisms of the Basic Mechanistic Account
Biological explanations that adhere to a basic mechanistic account like the one above
have often been criticized as inadequately representing and explaining many biological
phenomena. I will group these criticisms into three types. First, treating mechanisms as
paradigmatically sequential and linear fails to accommodate a vast number of dynamic biological
processes that are non-sequential, oscillatory, branching or feedback systems (Bechtel and
Abrahamsen 2005, 2013; Bechtel 2011). Second, a strong requirement for regularity in
mechanisms fails to accommodate the biological processes that are internally and temporally
stochastic as a result of their dependence on the levels of free energy in the system. Finally, the
basic mechanistic accounts fail to adequately distinguish between processes that are organized in
an orderly way with parts that have differential roles and local relations, and those processes in
which such features are absent (Levy and Bechtel 2013; Levy 2014).

1.3.1 Non-Sequential Dynamic Mechanisms
The basic mechanistic account emphasizes that a mechanism moves from start or set-up
conditions to finish or termination conditions in an ordered and sequential way (Machamer et al.
2000). In a series of papers, William Bechtel and Adele Abrahamsen argue that the basic
mechanistic account is limited by its emphasis on sequences of operations (Bechtel and
Abrahamsen 2005, 2013; Bechtel 2011, 2012, 2013). They advance the term dynamic
mechanistic explanation for an extended account that includes non-sequentially organized
mechanisms.
The most straightforward and tractable organization that a process can have is one in
which there is spatial adjacency and connectedness in its parts, and a stepwise temporal sequence
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in its operations. Machine-like mechanisms are often organized in this way. More complex
sequential organizations are also common. The Krebs cycle is not a start to finish sequence, but
rather a sequence that runs in a loop. Many biochemical mechanisms are also built around some
sort of negative feedback loop, a process in which the result of the process regulates the process
itself.
Understanding these more complex sequences requires one to become increasingly more
concerned with the dynamics of mechanisms, or how changes in the environment can affect the
rate, duration and activation of a mechanism. The basic mechanistic account can accommodate
this low-level dynamical behavior as long as it is sequential. But many biological mechanisms
exhibit oscillations or more complex dynamical behavior, and this can be crucial for
orchestrating operations within the mechanism (Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2013). A challenge to
the basic mechanistic account comes from complex dynamical behavior that emerges when
mechanism organization is non-sequential. Organization might be non-sequential because there
are forks that can take the mechanism in different directions. Non-sequential organization might
also arise from redundant but different sub-mechanisms, such that final product or state of the
primary mechanism is unaffected, but the path to that point can differ. Given a particular endstate it might be impossible to determine the specific path a non-sequential mechanism traveled
to get there. This is not the case for a sequential mechanism. This doesn’t mean that a nonsequential mechanism doesn’t produce regular changes, or that the parts and relations of the
mechanism are indescribable. Rather, it is a point about how in any given instance of the
mechanism, the unfolding activity of that mechanism might differ in response to differences in
start-up conditions or ongoing environmental inputs.
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1.3.2 Stochastic Mechanisms
Under the basic mechanistic account, a process must behave regularly in order for it to be
considered a mechanism. What makes a mechanism regular is the productive continuity between
stages (Machamer et al. 2000). A mechanism regularly produces or gives rise to the same
phenomenon because earlier stages lead reliably to final stages, so that different instances of a
mechanism share patterns of activity among similar or identical entities (Andersen 2012). A
strong requirement for regularity in mechanisms fails to accommodate the biological processes
that are internally and temporally stochastic, such as when their mode of operation is highly
dependent on the levels of free energy in the system. In these types of systems, changes are
probabilistic rather than regular. In many cases, instances of a stochastic mechanism do not share
the exact same pattern of activity among even identical entities.
Let’s return to the example of protein synthesis. The mechanism outlined in Section 1
was a version of the classic textbook explanation of protein synthesis. The ribosome is one of the
primary players in the mechanism of protein synthesis. As more has been learned about it, the
picture of protein synthesis has begun to change. Moore (2012) characterizes the progress in
describing the ribosome since the first atomic resolution crystal structures of ribosomal subunits
were published in 2000. The explicit goal of many structural biochemists was and is to provide a
“movie” of protein synthesis. In this project the ribosome is characterized at discrete stages. The
protein synthesis movie is created by characterizing all the different states of the ribosome and
how they are related to each other, these are still frames of the movie that are put in order and
played to show the process of protein synthesis. At the heart of the movie is a ribosome that is
doing something. There are regular changes between stages, and earlier stages lead reliably to
later stages.
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Moore argues that these structure-based movies of the ribosome make it appear to be
something that it is not. The reason that the movies are misleading is because ribosomes don’t
behave like machines that can be explained mechanically9. Moore states that: “[A]ll the
functionally significant movements of the ribosome, both internal and external, are biased
random walks, and it is most unlikely that any given ribosome will ever do exactly the same
thing twice as it elongates some polypeptide” and “It follows that if a movie of elongation is not
to be totally misleading, it must depict the endless series of meaningless, thermally driven,
conformational fluctuations that separate one functionally significant event from the next.” He
predicts that 99.99% of the activity in protein elongation is random fluctuation that has nothing
to do with function and that most of the progress through the protein elongation cycle is driven
by changes in relative free energies coming from conformational state changes.
Think of a machine like a mechanical clock. The workings of the mechanical clock are
explained by looking at how the physical parts of its mechanism interact. The mainspring stores
mechanical energy through torsion. As the mainspring unwinds it rotates a central gear, which in
turn drives the rest of the gear train. The last gear engages the escapement. The escapement is
also engaged by the balance wheel, a weighted wheel which keeps time by rotating back and
forth at fixed intervals according to the tuning of a balance spring which pushes back on it. The
interaction between the mainspring and the balance wheel via the escapement mechanism turn
the gears at a fixed rate. These gears are attached to the rotating hands of the clock face, which
indicate the time. The movement and interactions of the parts of the watch explain how the
watch works.

9

See Pigliucci and Boudry (2011) and Boudry and Pigliucci (2013) for further discussion of
some problems with machine metaphors in biology.
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The parts of a protein, like a ribosome, don’t stand in the same relations as the parts of a
mechanical clock. The mainspring of a watch can reliably turn the gear train. Macromolecules
immersed in liquids are at the mercy of frictional and thermodynamic forces. At any given time,
the forces produced by a ribosome are one-tenth of the level or less than the average
thermodynamic forces experienced by that ribosome. This means that the ribosome is randomly
pushed into different conformational states by external forces, rather than moving in sequence
according to the activity and interactions of its pars. Thus, all the functionally significant
activities of the ribosome, both internal and external, in protein synthesis are probabilistic
(Moore 2012). The probability that a ribosome will engage in an activity that is important for
protein synthesis depends on the free energy in the system and the presence of protein factors
that promote some states over others.
Moore recommends that we “come to think of the ribosome as the dynamic, constantly
varying structure it is and always was” and move away from quasi-mechanical explanations for
the properties of ribosomes and “instead seek to understand them in terms of the particle’s
conformational energy landscape.” He boldly claims that structure-based movies of
macromolecular processes have no explanatory power.
The mechanism of protein synthesis doesn’t neatly fit into the basic mechanistic account.
There is no productive continuity between stages, where earlier stages directly produce later
stages. Rather, the mechanism proceeds stochastically. Movement through the process of protein
synthesis is a biased random walk. Watches reliably tell time, and ribosomes reliably produce
proteins, but the relations between the temporal stages of the mechanisms are much different. A
watch has a fixed structure and operates in a fixed sequence. The parts of the ribosome are
constantly in motion and changing their relations to each other due to forces that dominate at the
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molecular level, such as: atomic bonds, friction, thermal forces and internal vibrational decay.
These ongoing interactions are what dynamically stabilize the ribosome even as it flows
constantly from conformation to conformation in a biased random walk. Furthermore, it is this
constant change that leads to the functionally important states needed for protein synthesis. The
ribosome is a dynamic, constantly varying entity, and it is this feature that is most explanatory
when it comes to understanding how the ribosome synthesizes proteins.
There is another notion of stochasticity in the context of mechanisms that is discussed in
Glennan (1997). Glennan is primarily concerned with causation and the relation between
stochastic and deterministic processes. On Glennan’s account of causation (1996, 1997), “two
events are causally related if and only if those events are connected by a mechanism”. A
mechanism, in turn, is “a complex system consisting of a number of parts which interact to
produce some outward behavior” (Glennan 1997: 509). The mechanism has “a set of observable
dispositions” that are explained by the interactions of the mechanism’s parts, which have their
own dispositions (Glennan 1997). In regards to stochasticity, the relation between the
dispositions of a mechanism and the dispositions of its parts can be related in three ways:
stochastic/deterministic, stochastic/stochastic, and deterministic/stochastic. Parts with stochastic
dispositions can underlie a deterministic mechanism. For example, the random behavior of
individual gas molecules leads to the deterministic behavior of gases at the macro level as
described by Boyle’s law. Likewise, chaotic systems where a small change in initial conditions
can lead to vastly different outcomes are (effectively) stochastic even if the underlying parts all
behave in deterministic ways. It is important to note that Glennan’s account is primarily
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concerned with our subjective understanding of processes10. It doesn’t matter if the process is
actually objectively random or deterministic, it only matters if it is effectively stochastic or
deterministic from our point of view.
An important distinction between my view and Glennan’s is that Glennan is giving a
theory of causation by which causality is captured in terms of the interactions of physical
processes. It doesn’t matter if the interactions are stochastic or deterministic. My focus is on a
much more restricted set of phenomena, those hierarchically structured processes that are
organized (to some extent) and show show regularity (to some extent). On my view, not every
causal process ought to be, by definition, mechanistic. Mechanisms feature in causal
explanations, but the metaphysical details need not be restricted to Glennan’s mechanistic theory
of causation. My account of mechanistic explanation is consistent with Glennan’s mechanistic
theory of causation, but not limited to it.

1.3.3 Order in Mechanisms
The basic mechanistic account requires that the entities in a process are organized if they
are to be considered a mechanism: parts must be appropriately located, structured, and oriented,
and the activities in which they engage must have a temporal order, rate, and duration. This
account fails to adequately distinguish between processes that are organized in an orderly way
with parts that have differential roles and local relations, and those processes in which such

10

Howick (2011) also talks about stochastic mechanisms in the context of the debate between
evidence-based medicine versus comparative clinical studies. Howick discusses how
mechanisms often have stochastic behaviors, but this has to do with our ability to predict
outcomes. The apparent stochasticity is thus subjective and may be the result of our incomplete
knowledge about the mechanism. This differs from my notion of stochasticity, where the
randomness is a basic feature of the mechanism under consideration. I thank Justin Garson for
bringing the Glennan and Howick discussions of stochasticity to my attention.
32

features are absent (Levy and Bechtel 2013; Levy 2014).
Consider two processes in the mechanism of Ca2+ regulation: the passive diffusion of
Ca2+ from the interior of the mitochondria out into the cytosol, and the active channeling of Ca2+
across a membrane. In the case of diffusion there is a system that consists of a semi-permeable
membrane that straddles an electrochemical gradient. The exterior environment is more
negatively charged than the interior environment and the positive Ca2+ ions will move across the
membrane until electrostatic equilibrium is reached. The rate of diffusion is primarily a factor of
the permeability of the membrane and the difference in charge between the two environments.
In the case of active channeling, when Ca2+ levels in the cytoplasm drop, secondary
messaging systems within the cell can activate protein complexes that release Ca2+ stores from
inside the endoplasmic reticulum. This example describes ryanodine receptor 2 (RYR2). RYR2
is a membrane-bound complex composed of four subunits that form a channel for Ca2+ to cross
(figure 2). The complex is associated with various proteins that function to modulate its opening
including: factors (like CSQ) that modulate the sensitivity of RYR2, transmembrane proteins that
facilitate the opening, multiple enzymes that bind and control the “powering” of RYR2 by
cAMP, and scaffolding proteins that bind further enzymes that reset and close the channel.
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Figure 1.2 Ryanodine receptor 2 (RYR2) based on Berridge et al. (2003). Illustration by Shawn
Simpson
Both of these example processes are dependent on system-level organization and feature
interactions between constituent parts. One important difference is in how they are ordered.
Active channeling is a highly ordered phenomenon: every component must be in the right place,
at the right time, playing the right role. Diffusion, on the other hand, is a disorderly phenomenon:
the role and layout of individual particles is insignificant. It doesn’t matter what ions help
generate the electrochemical difference across the membrane from the high Ca2+ concentration,
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nor does it matter what the composition of the membrane is as long as it is semi-permeable. All
that matters are the average properties of the components of the system.
Levy (2014) gives a characterization of orderliness that I will adopt here. Suppose we
have a system S, exhibiting a behavior B. S is orderly to the extent that:
(a) Distinct components of S play different roles in bringing about B.
(b) Components play their roles in virtue of local relations to other components.
An orderly system exhibits an internal division of labor, analogous to that present in
many manmade machines: each part does something distinct and recognizable, but there is also
interdependence among parts, so that the system’s overall behavior is an integrated product of
their activities. Component parts can be distinct in two ways. They might be distinct because
they are spatially separated. They might also be functionally distinct, i.e., they are distinct with
respect to the difference made by the components. Levy fleshes this out in terms of Woodward’s
conception of modularity (Levy 2014; Woodward 2003). A component’s contribution is modular
if the difference it makes is independent of the difference made by other components. That is:
component X’s contribution is modular if it is possible to disrupt the activity of other
components without affecting the contribution of X. In RYR2 channeling, for instance, it may be
possible to deform the transmembrane proteins that help stabilize the size of the channel
opening, thus disrupting channel size, without affecting the components that flip the RYR2
complex between open and closed states, and vice versa. These would then be distinct
components of the active channeling mechanism. This functional distinctness in roles is what
contributes to higher levels of orderliness.
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The requirement that components play their roles in virtue of local relations to other
components is related to the idea that an orderly system exhibits internal integration. It is
possible for a system to have functionally distinct parts, i.e. for its parts to contribute
differentially, without those parts being integrated. For example, the electrochemical charge of
the cell is determined by the mixture of positive and negative ions within the cytoplasm. There
are many different components that play different roles, but they do so by freely mixing, such
that the specific layout of elements does not matter much. It is an aggregate property of the
system (Wimsatt 1986). This is different than an active membrane channel system, there the
local relations between parts are very important for the proper functioning of the process. In
regards to electrochemical charge, it won’t matter much if you switch two Ca2+ ions on opposite
sides of cell with each other, or if you swap a Ca2+ for two H+ or a Mg2+. In contrast, an active
membrane channel will be greatly disrupted if a transmembrane protein is swapped with a
receptor that binds cAMP.

1.4 Dealing with Mechanistic Diversity
I have given a basic account of mechanistic diversity and then categorized three ways in
which this basic account can be found to be lacking. None of the criticisms I have discussed have
challenged the existence of mechanistic phenomena, but rather find the basic account inadequate
for handling the diversity of processes that are putative mechanisms. One route to dealing with
this diversity of mechanism-like phenomena is to try to and isolate the true mechanisms by
giving a more substantial theory. Another route is to subdivide mechanisms into smaller discrete
categories: machine mechanisms, biological mechanisms, dynamic mechanisms, etc. A third
approach begins by recognizing that there is gradient from phenomena that are produced by
processes that are paradigmatically machine-like in their mechanistic functioning, to phenomena
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that are produced by processes that don’t conform to even the most minimal and basic account of
mechanisms. The approach here is not to try and divide this space up discretely, but to describe
the dimensions along which these phenomena grade into each other. I offer a brief account of
mechanisms in the spirit of this third approach following the example set by the treatment of
biological populations in Godfrey-Smith (2009).
Once again, my starting point is the basic mechanistic account. The minimal goal in
mechanistic explanation is to explain a phenomenon by identifying the lower-level phenomena
that produce the higher-level target phenomena. This requires identifying the lower-level entities
and characterizing what they do and how they interact with other. This is the minimal notion I
will use for what is required to consider something as even a putative mechanism: a
hierarchically structured system where the higher-level can be at least partially decomposed into
lower-level parts. Not all phenomena with these characteristics will be mechanisms, but it is
possible to give the features of systems which distinguish the clear or paradigm cases of
mechanisms from more marginal ones. Three interacting parameters will be used to make this
distinction (figure 1.3).
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Figure 1.3 Three dimensions of mechanism-related processes.
The first parameter is the isolability of the system. This is the measure of the overall
sharpness of the boundary between the system and its environment. Identifying the start-up,
maintenance and finishing conditions of a process requires being able to identify what is part of
the process and what is input from, or output to, the environment. An example of a system with
sharp boundaries is a mechanical watch. An example of a system with vague boundaries is a
population undergoing speciation with geneflow. An intermediate case might be synapse firing.
The second parameter is the organization of the system. This is the measure of the
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orderliness of the system in terms of the distinctiveness of its component parts, the discreteness
of its component parts, and the importance of local relations between parts in producing the
higher-level phenomena. Highly ordered systems include bacterial flagella, and again, a
mechanical watch. A system with low order is two liquids undergoing passive diffusion across a
membrane, and a system with intermediate order might be a population undergoing selection.
The third parameter is the sequentiality of the system. This is a measure of the linearity
and stochasticity of the system. A system with low sequentiality might be characterized by
feedback loops, cycling, oscillations, variation in how component parts interact, or stochastic
activities. A system with low sequentiality is the process of Ca2+ homeostasis. A moderately
sequential system is the process of protein synthesis. A highly sequential system is a coinoperated gumball machine.
The clearest cases of mechanisms are machine mechanisms like a mechanical watch,
which have a high degree of isolability, organization and sequentiality. These are the systems
that most clearly meet the criteria of the basic mechanistic account. An example that is at best a
marginal case of a mechanism is evolution by natural selection, a process that has a lower degree
of isolability, organization and sequentiality. Many biological processes that are taken to be true
mechanisms are highly isolable and ordered, but are only moderately sequential. There are a
large number of intermediate cases.
There is an increasing recognition of the importance of cyclical, oscillating and biased
stochastic processes for the explanation of biological phenomena. Using this multi-dimensional
framework could help to extend the basic account of mechanistic explanation so that it can deal
with biological mechanisms that are non-sequential, stochastic or less-orderly.
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CHAPTER 2: Reorienting Scientific Explanation – The Case
from Robustness in Biological Systems
2.1 Introduction
To paraphrase the ecologist C. S. Holling: There are two ways to look at the world. In
one way of looking at the world we see how changes cascade through an otherwise stable world.
Winding a watch causes the clocks hands to move, death follows poisoning, and a sprout grows
after watering a seed. But another view of the world concentrates not so much on identifying
important changes or the presence or absence of an effect, as upon the persistence of things and
the relations that maintain them. In this way of looking at the world we see how stability and
function are maintained in a world that is constantly in flux. An ecosystem maintains the same
yearly cycles of community structure across seasonal variation, species retain their general
character as the individuals that make them up are born and die, a cell maintains homeostasis
across a wide range of environments.
These are two different ways of viewing the behavior of processes and systems, and the
usefulness of either view depends greatly on the properties of the system concerned. If we are
examining a device that performs a specific function in a reliable and nonvariable way, then we
are likely to be concerned with identifying the factors that make a difference to whether or not
that device performs its function. But if we are examining a system that is profoundly affected by
a fluctuating environment, such that the way it operates varies in response to unpredictable
external changes, then identifying the factors that change its behavior become less important and
we are likely to focus more on the persistence of the internal relations responsible for its
function. Attention shifts from a focus on the causes of change to explaining stability in response
to constant change.
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One striking feature of many biological processes and systems is their high degree of
robustness, or the reliable production of a similar output under a wide range of circumstances.
Despite the ubiquity and importance of robustness, many explanations pass over the
organizational details that give rise to it. Biological systems are often self-organizing systems
full of complex nested relations and interactions that resist decomposition into discrete parts that
can be modeled in a straightforward way. Different and useful insight might be obtained,
therefore, by focusing on the relations that generate robustness at the system level, and by
shifting emphasis from change-dependent relations to the holistic relations that maintain the
function or behavior of a system.
The overall goal of this paper is to explore the behavior and organization of robust
systems in order to see if a different perspective can yield insights useful for both theory and
practice. I start by discussing two fields that have recently started to pay increased attention to
robustness and the mechanisms that generate it: ecology and evolutionary developmental
genetics. It is worth going through developments in both fields because an increased attention on
robustness occurred independently and probably for different reasons. I then turn to the concept
of robustness directly. Merely noting whether or not a system is robust is often explanatorily
inadequate, so I propose that our focus should shift to the different ways in which a system can
be robust. I develop a general taxonomy of kinds of robustness in order to help with this goal. I
conclude by returning to the idea that there are two complementary explanatory perspectives that
are useful for understanding the world.
It is worth noting before we delve in that the terminology surrounding the concept of
robustness is a mess, likely an effect of the rapid and recent increase of interest in the topic.
Terminology is inconsistent within fields and difficult to compare between fields. I will do my
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best to simplify and clarify the terminology in this section, and I will later define terms for how I
will use them when developing a more generalized framework for understanding the varieties of
robustness.

2.2 Two Explanatory Reorientations in Biology
2.2.1 Dynamics and Resiliency in Ecology
Ecology is the study of the interactions between organisms and their environment. Early
theoretical approaches to ecology were quantitative in nature and focused on the dynamics of
organismal relations. Vito Volterra, a mathematician and physicist, was an important figure here.
He helped develop a mathematical approach to the study of biology, his most famous
contribution being the Lotka-Volterra, or predator-prey, equations. These are a pair of
differential equations used to describe the dynamics of a two species interaction where one is a
predator and the other is prey. Quantitative approaches were soon developed for other ecological
interactions and processes: birth and death rates, immigration and emigration, survival and
reproduction, population growth rates, density-dependent interactions, energy/food intake,
competition, disease, parasitism, mutualism, etc. A common feature of this approach is that it
isolates a relation of interest and treats it like a dynamical system that can be described through
mathematics. This is a powerful approach, because if the system is modeled accurately the model
gives insight into the causal relations that are important for explaining the phenomenon of
interest. It will also show the effects of changing those relations, of tweaking the variables, so to
speak.
Knowledge of ecological relations is critically important because human well-being
depends on a wide range of ecosystem services. For example, fisheries provide a significant
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proportion of our food. Understanding the dynamics of fish populations allows us to figure out
how many fish we can catch, when we should catch them, and at what size while still
maintaining the population at a level that will allow us to keep on fishing indefinitely. It turns out
though, that the history of ecosystem management is primarily a history of failures to predict the
effects of change. Whether that be the effects of harvesting, the introduction or removal of a
species, a natural disaster, or the spatial fragmentation of a population.
Given a century of advances in dynamical theory, why are we still not very good at
predicting the effects of change on ecosystems? A central problem is that ecosystems are
complex. They are often characterized by multiple possible outcomes and the potential for rapid
change and major regime shifts due to slower and smaller changes in internal or external
influences. Changes in interactions at small scales can eventually end up shaping the dynamics
of the macroscopic system which then can feed back to reshape the interactions at the smaller
scales. Most ecosystems are also likely to be in a transient state, which makes them behave quite
differently than a system near equilibrium modeled by dynamic equations.
Another problem, emphasized in Connell and Ghedini (2015), is that there is a
predisposition to the way we study change that comes from the way we think about disturbance.
A disturbance is considered to have occurred when some event causes observable changes in
some property of interest; for example, species composition, biomass, or productivity.
Conversely, if we notice that there is no observable change in the property of interest, we
conclude that the disturbance had no effect, and thus wasn’t a disturbance at all. This approach
ignores any reorganization or compensatory processes that might be active within the system that
buffer against change. The problem of prediction and insights into the non-equilibrium and
complex character of most ecosystems led some ecologists to push for a different perspective for
43

understanding ecosystem behavior.
This alternative approach, which goes by many names but is probably most often called
resilience theory, was introduced into the ecological literature by Holling (1973). According to
this theory change is ubiquitous in ecosystems. In addition to analyzing the component relations
of an ecosystem and combining them to try and build a bottom-up understanding of system
behavior, we should take a top-down approach and analyze the properties that determine the
persistence of relationships within a system, as well as its capacity to absorb change and
maintain structure and functions. Central features of the resilience approach are the emphases on
alternative stable states for a system and the mechanisms that are responsible for renewal and
reorganization before, during and after a disturbance.
The resilience framework became especially important in two projects. It was used in
ecosystem management and conservation because it helped to predict ecosystem recovery after a
disturbance which in turn is used to shape policy for resource harvesting and responding to
environmental disasters (Levin and Lubchenko 2008). Elsewhere in ecology, there was a drive to
discover the mechanisms and relationships that underpin ecosystem resilience in order to predict
responses to future internal or external changes.
Resilience theory has undergone a lot of refinement in the last four decades as insight has
been drawn from many fields. An unfortunate side effect of this interdisciplinary effort has been
an explosion of conflicting terminology. There is considerable confusion about the meanings of
terms associated with resilience theory.
For simplicity, I will draw on Hodgson et al. (2015) while providing a more detailed
overview of the approach. The terminology and conceptual breakdown presented here is by no
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means representative of the entire field, but it is clear and straightforward. The resilience of an
ecosystem is a measure of the capacity of that system to persist or maintain function in the face
of disturbance. This capacity can be broken into two components, resistance and recovery, which
can vary (possibly independently) across systems. Resistance describes the immediate impact of
an external disturbance on an ecosystem, while recovery represents the capacity of a disturbed
ecosystem to return towards an equilibrium. The rate of return is called elasticity. If alternative
stable states exist for the system, then latitude describes the distance between a stable state and
the tipping point into a different stable state. Different systems can vary across all these
parameters.
A researcher might measure the level of disease exposure that is required to cause
infection (resistance), the capacity to fight off an infection and return to a healthy state
(recovery), the rate of recovery (elasticity), and the severity of disease that is required to push the
system into another permanent state like death (latitude). As should be obvious, resilience is not
a universal character of a system. A particular system might be more resilient to one type of
disturbance and more susceptible to another, just like a particular person might be resilient to one
disease and susceptible to another. Furthermore, the resilience of a system to a particular
disturbance can change as the system evolves, often in subtle ways. The idea that the impacts of
disturbance might depend on initial system state is known as hysteresis. Hysteresis is well known
in ecological systems. This implies a very interesting feedback loop between disturbances and
resilience, mediated by the adaptive dynamics of the system (Hodgeson et al. 2016).
The approach taken from physics and engineering of breaking a system into parts and
describing them is insufficient for understanding the robustness of complex adaptive systems like
ecosystems, but it can provide insights into what makes ecosystems robust and how. Indeed, a
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fundamental challenge for understanding and managing complex systems is to unite the topdown system level approach with the bottom-up mechanism approach. (Levin and Lubchenko
2008). This two-prong approach is important for increasing our predictive power when moving
towards novel future changes like climate change.

2.2.2 Mechanisms and Robustness in the Cell
Evolutionary developmental biology (evo-devo) is the study of how developmental
processes evolve with a focus on the dynamics of gene expression, the complex relations
between genotypes and phenotypes, and how everything together affects phenotypic evolution.
Evo-devo only came together as a field in the late 20th century after advances in molecular
biology and the widespread sequencing of DNA, RNA and proteins led to a better understanding
of the molecular basis of developmental mechanisms.
The questions being addressed by evo-devo have a longer history. Population genetics
and quantitative genetics produced a large body of knowledge regarding the evolution of
genotypes and phenotypes but had to make very simple assumptions about the relations between
genotypes and phenotypes. Scientists for the most part had to rely on statistical correlations
among quantitative characters, i.e. those traits that varied in such a way that they could be
measured. Understanding the evolution of complex genotype-phenotype relations remained
elusive. Evo-devo tackles these complex relations head-on.
Investigations into the developmental pathways underlying phenotypes have revealed a
high degree of complexity in developmental systems. Even some of the simplest organismal
phenotypes are influenced by hundreds of genes. Developmental pathways are often also
exceedingly robust (Nijhout 2002; Bateson and Gluckman 2012). In the broad domain of
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organismal biology, robustness usually refers to the ability of a system feature to maintain its
function against perturbations. System features of relevance include: molecular structure, an
enzyme’s catalytic ability, a regulatory circuit’s expression, a metabolic network’s activity, or
the expression of a phenotype at the organismal level. Perturbations are often categorized as
coming from three sources: stochastic noise, environmental variation, and genetic variation11.
A flurry of research into robustness in recent years has found that proteins can tolerate
thousands of amino acid changes, metabolic networks can function after the removal of
important chemical reactions, gene regulation networks can withstand changes to key gene
interactions, and genes can be deleted without affecting an organism’s adult phenotype (See
Wagner 2005; Steinacher and Soyer 2012; Whitacre 2012 for more details). This massive
amount of observed robustness has spurred investigation into the mechanisms underlying and
responsible for robustness, the evolution of robustness and the evolutionary reasons for its
ubiquity. This has also led to a great deal of interdisciplinary crossover with systems biology.
What is the relevance of this outgrowth of research to the project at hand? Because of the
complexity of developmental systems, correlations between singular changes or interventions on
a system and downstream effects give very little information about the causal relations
connecting the two. Strong correlations might be primarily an experimental artifact if causal
connections only hold in very constrained circumstances as the result of being the product of
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Noise refers to the stochastic fluctuations that occur in any biological system, for example in
the concentration of a biological molecule or in a cell’s position, either over time, or between
two genetically identical individuals, even if the external environment is constant. The second
kind of perturbation is variation in the external environment, for example a change in
temperature, salinity or nutrient availability. The third kind of perturbation is genetic change,
either through mutation or recombination. Felix and Wagner (2008).
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complex and rare interactions. Conversely, there might be no correlation between a particular
change and the system’s response, not because the two are not causally connected, but because
of compensatory effects resulting from the robust nature of the causal connections. Worries
about recovering causal structures from correlative data are not unique to biological systems, but
they do cause particular trouble here.
The practical application of a bottom-up approach that investigates a system mechanismby-mechanism and relation-by-relation to the investigation of entire developmental and cellular
pathways has been limited. This is mainly due to the enormous degree of dimensionality and
non-linearity found in biological systems. Intervening on a particular mechanism to measure
perturbations in the system for all these dimensions and their interactions is impractical.
Constraining the complexity of an explanation by simplifying the number of factors in play
through the judicial use of ceteris paribus clauses might lead a false picture of the causal
complexity of the system. If system decomposition and bottom-up causal-mechanical
explanations are too complex and bloated, or not widely generalizable, what can be done? Like
we saw in ecology, the answer has been to investigate and characterize system-level properties in
addition to the lower level mechanisms.
While a full theory of robustness in cellular systems remains elusive; both in terms of the
mechanisms by which robustness is achieved and the selection pressures that have led to
widespread robustness, there has been progress in uncovering systems principles that contribute
to robustness across biological disciplines12. Important system-level properties include

12

Whitacre (2012) and Bateson and Gluckman (2012) provide good overviews of some of this
progress.
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redundancy and various robust network architectures--which Wagner (2005) calls distributed
robustness. Redundancy refers to two parts of a system being able to perform similar or identical
tasks. This might be because the parts are identical, such as in the case of kidneys or as the result
of gene duplication events. It might also be because two different parts can perform the same
task. This is usually called functional redundancy. Think of a hybrid car with its two power
sources. In the cell, glycolysis and lactic acid fermentation are functionally redundant in regards
to the generation of ATP.
Robust network architectures include scale-free networks, small world networks and
bow-tie architectures (Kitano 2004, 2007). The details of these network structures are not
important for now. They can be described in a general way as when the parts of a system
contribute to system function, but all of these parts have different roles. When one part fails or is
changed through mutations, the system can compensate for this failure, but not because a ‘‘backup’’ redundant part takes over the failed part’s role. Wagner (2005) calls this robustness that is
due to the complex network of relations in a system ‘distributed robustness’, and gives another
helpful example: “On lower levels of biological organization, the paradigmatic examples of
distributed robustness are biological macromolecules, such as proteins and RNA. Their folding
in space involves the cooperation of hundreds of building blocks—nucleotides or amino acids—
each of which forms unique (non-redundant) interactions with other building blocks. If a change
in one amino acid leaves a protein’s three-dimensional conformation unchanged, is this because
the protein contained a redundant ‘back-up’ amino acid? Clearly not: The thermodynamic
stability of any macromolecular structure is the sum of all contributions that such interactions
make to the structure’s free energy.” (Wagner 2005).
Research into the causes, mechanisms, and organizational features of robustness is
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changing our understanding of ecology, developmental, and evolutionary biology. Whitacre
(2012) speculates that robustness may be ubiquitous in biological systems in part because
proteins, cells, biochemical networks, immune systems, organisms, and natural populations exist
within changing and sometimes novel conditions under which the maintenance of satisfactory
performance will determine persistence or function. No matter the reason why robustness is so
commonly found in biological systems at all levels, it is clear that it is an important feature that
calls out to be understood. It is also changing the way that biologists approach their research and
the explanations they provide. As we have seen in these examples, researchers have begun to
focus on the complex interrelations that exist at the system level in order to supplement the
investigations into mechanistic approaches used for understanding the individual parts of a
system.

2.3 Robustness in Philosophy
Discussions of robustness are included in most causal explanatory accounts, but it is a
topic rarely treated at length. There has been a relative consensus on the informative nature of
robustness. The stock example regards the supposed inevitability of the First World War:
The stability of an outcome of a causal process in spite of significant variation in initial
conditions can be informative about an ideal causal explanatory text in the same way that it is
informative to learn, regarding a given causal explanation of the First World War, that a world
war would have come about (according to this explanation) even if no bomb had exploded in
Sarajevo. This sort of robustness or resilience of a process is important to grasp in coming to
know explanations based upon it. (Railton 1981: 251)
On some accounts, an explanation showing that a process is robust is of increased
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practical value, rather than increased explanatory value. Railton (1981), Wimsatt (1981), and
Batterman (2002) roughly fall into this tradition. Others, such as Jackson and Pettit (1992),
Sterelny (1996), and Strevens (2008) see the recognition of robustness as increasing explanatory
value. All of these accounts share a common feature. They are only concerned with whether a
causal process or system is robust at all relative to some change or difference.
I will instead offer a framework for distinguishing the importantly different ways in
which a causal process or system can be robust. Woodward (2013) makes some first moves in
this direction when he discusses biological robustness as an example when arguing against the
overextension of the mechanistic explanation program. There distinguishes between robustness
stemming from redundant back-up mechanisms, robustness stemming from complex dynamics
(what he calls robustness without fine-tunedness), and robustness resulting from topological or
network features of the system. I will not argue here for the necessity of a fuller account of
robustness in a general theory of scientific explanation. Instead I will just contend that if a theory
of explanation cannot make room for a focus on system-level details like those found in my
analysis of robustness, then it cannot be adequate for understanding causal reasoning in biology.
I pause to note the relations between my project and two similar projects by scientists,
e.g., Bateson and Gluckman (2012) and Whitacre (2012). Bateson and Gluckman review the
interaction between plasticity and robustness, which they define as the “consistency of the
phenotype despite environmental or genetic perturbation” (Bateson and Gluckman 2012, pg. 8).
They use a more delimited notion of robustness, constrained as it is to phenotype consistency
across developmental environments, than the one I will try to develop. There is a similarity
though in that they are also particularly interested in the many mechanisms that are responsible
for generating robustness. They survey, via a list of definitions, some of the concepts that are
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important for understanding how different kinds of robustness are produced in the context of the
evolution and functioning of developmental and behavioral systems. Whitacre (2012) also
recognizes that there is an assortment of mechanisms that underlie robustness, but highlights how
many of these mechanisms share similar system-level properties, such as modularity, smallworld networks, bow-tie architectures, and other topological features. He then explores the
relation between these system-level features and common features of the processes that generate
them, such as functional redundancy, degeneracy, adaptive plasticity, environment tracking, and
environment shaping. Neither paper goes as far as trying to develop a more general hierarchy of
broad sub-types of robustness, which is what I lay out in the next two sections. I don’t see my
project as in conflict with either Bateson and Gluckman (2012) or Whitacre (2012). They
provide some of the necessary details for understanding robustness in biology. I am trying to
subsume those details into a more general taxonomy of robustness in order to suggest that paying
attention to how and why a system is robust is a fruitful perspective for understanding the
behavior of systems in domains other than ecology, genetics, and cellular biology.

2.4 Ways to be Robust
I will start my account of robustness with the related notion of reliability. A reliable
process is a process that consistently produces some phenomenon (or suitably similar small set of
phenomena) starting from some set of initial conditions (or suitably similar small range of sets of
initial conditions). It is essentially a regularity relation linking two phenomena. Whether we take
a process to be reliable or not will depend on the relation between the process and the target of
explanation. The process of flipping a fair coin isn’t a reliable process for generating heads, but it
is a reliable process for generating a 50/50 distribution of heads and tails over an extended series
of flips. A reliable process has the general form of [Initial Conditions] --- [Black Box Process] -52

--> [Regular Phenomena]. A thorough explanation will try to open up and show what is inside
that black box.
Robustness is a different type of relation. A relation is robust if it holds under a range of
circumstances. This might be a relation between two different events or entities, or it might be a
relation across the same entity at different times. More specifically, a process is robust to the
degree that it can reliably produce a particular outcome under a wide range of circumstances.
Namely, a wide range of initial conditions, perturbations, and parameters (cf. Strevens 2008). I
will also be speaking of the robustness of systems. A system is robust to the degree that it can
maintain its function or behavior under a wide range of external or internal perturbations (cf.
Kitano 2004; Woodward 2013). This is just a way of rearranging the above criteria, in both cases
the key feature is stability in the face of changes. I won’t make sharp distinctions here between
processes and systems. I view systems in this context as a set of integrated causal processes
interacting in a structured way to maintain an equilibrium point or to produce a behavior or
product. A mechanism is an example of a type of system structure that produces something.
Ecosystems and organisms are systems that maintain equilibrium points.
A robust process/system is a reliable process/system, but a reliable process/system is not
necessarily robust. For example, a retinal scanner reliably unlocks a door given the right eye
input, but it is not robust to variation in inputs in regards to door unlocking. Nor would the owner
of the device want it to be. A suitably advanced one might be so sensitive to initial conditions as
to lock-down if the temperature, pressure, gravity, etc. varies at all. Yet, given the right initial
conditions, the door unlocks every time. Conversely, the same system might be extremely robust
in regards to the behavior of keeping a door locked.
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2.5 Varieties of Robustness
I distinguish among three different ways in which robustness can be achieved and use the
terms redundancy, resistance, and resilience for the respective varieties of robustness. As we
have already seen these terms are used in different ways across a wide variety of fields, so it will
be necessary to stipulate their meanings. The way that I will use these terms will cut across some
of the literature, both scientific and philosophical. My primary goal in this section is not to try
and fix the meaning of these terms. Rather, I am attempting to get at a cluster of related and often
confused concepts in order to articulate them in a clear way. Figure 1 at the end of this section
gives a pictorial version of the terms I use in my account.13
Before looking at them each in more detail, it might be easiest to quickly compare and
contrast the three kinds of robustness. Here is a rough analogy to get us started. We have just
been through a bad storm and most of the trees at the park have been destroyed. Three types of
trees survive: a large oak tree, a willow tree, and an aspen tree from a clonal colony. We want to
know what explains the tree survival in regards to the storm. How where they able to remain
intact? Luckily, there was a video camera trained on the park. As we watch the tape we see the
wind slowly ramp up. In response to the wind, the large oak tree remains relatively unaffected. It
maintains its form in the face of the howling winds. The flexible willow tree, on the other hand,
whips about and bends in the wind. It changes its form in response to the storm in order to stay
intact. The aspen clones form a small colony cluster connected by a common root system. The
individual aspen clones are not as strong as the oak nor as flexible as the willow, and one by one

Whitacre (2012) was an influence on my thinking here and the paper provides a good overview
of specific examples of some mechanisms underlying robustness in biological phenomena, with
a focus on developmental and cellular biology.
13
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they start to snap. But, one single tree makes it through the storm and so the colony survives.
In this analogy, all three tree varieties are robust to large changes in wind speed.
Extending the analogy then we see three different ways to be robust to the storm. When the
response to change is resistant, it is because either the system or process itself isn’t affected, or if
it is affected it doesn’t change the character of how the process unfolds. The oak tree is
insensitive to the variability in conditions and so is resistant. It looks exactly the same under a
wide range of wind speeds. This contrasts with resilience, where the system is changed or
reorganized but still maintains its function or ability to bounce back to equilibrium after the
disturbance. The willow tree responds dynamically to the variability in conditions by flexing and
changing in response to the wind and so is resilient. It looks very different in different wind
patterns. Finally, robustness takes the form of redundancy when there are back-up processes or
fail-safes that can kick in if one part of the system fails. The aspen colony survives because even
though individual aspen clones are destroyed by the storm, there are duplicate back-ups that
make it. A pictorial overview of these concepts can be found below.
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Figure 2.1 Illustration of robustness categories. In the redundancy illustration, the process is
disrupted and a back-up takes over. In the resistance and resilience diagrams, the black line
represents the mean response to disturbance or changes in initial conditions. Grey lines represent
individual paths through state space in response to particular changes. Grey dots represent basins
of attraction or selection events, if they exist. Note that resistant processes don’t change their
behavior to a high degree, while resilient systems are marked by a high degree of flexibility.
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Robustness isn’t a universal property of a given system or process. It is always relative to
both a particular function or behavior, and a particular kind of disturbance. Systems might also
be robust in different ways to different things, such that they are resistant to some changes and
resilient to others. Similarly, robustness is often nested. A resilient process might be made up of
a network of sub-processes that are each themselves resistant, or have subsystems full of
redundant parts. With these rough distinctions in mind, I will now look at each kind of
robustness in more detail.

2.5.1 Redundancy
Robustness is achieved through redundancy when a system or process has multiple means
by which to produce an effect or behavior. If one process or structure is disrupted, another
process or structure ensures that the whole system isn’t disrupted. I distinguish between two
general kinds of redundancy: backups and compensatory processes.
Back-up processes enhance robustness because they can work as fail-safes. If one process
fails, then it can be replaced by others. Back-ups can come in the form of duplication, when there
are, strictly speaking, more of something than are necessary for the task. Think of kidneys, or the
load-bearing beams of a bridge. Back-ups can also come from functional redundancy in a diverse
set of processes where each process produces the effect in a different way. Take an effect e and
initial condition sets a, b, and c. A mechanism composed of three distinct causal pathways for
bringing about e--call them A, B, and C--where each pathway is sensitive to a different set of
initial conditions, a, b, and c respectively, would be functionally redundant. If one of the
processes is disrupted, the others can still bring about e. Think of a car that has both seatbelts and
airbags, or the different cellular pathways for transforming glucose into usable energy under
different conditions.
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Finally, take a related case where there is a system containing processes A and B. A has
two effects, e1 and e2, and B has two effects, e2 and e3. These are distinct processes that do
different things, but relative to e2, the processes are functionally redundant. A is a partial back-up
for B, and vice versa. This is often called degeneracy. Many biological processes that are
functionally redundant are also degenerate.
Redundancy can also come in the form of compensatory processes. Instead of acting as
an independent back-up, one process responds to the disruption of a different process in order to
bring about the effect. Repair mechanisms are a good example of a compensatory process. Heat
shock protein Hsp90 is another important process. Hsp90 is a protein that confers robustness to
the process of protein folding by assisting other proteins to fold or refold into functionally
relevant conformations when temperatures are elevated above physiological conditions.
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Figure 2.2 Illustration of Types of Redundancy - Component parts of a system often display a
range of closely related functions. Component parts are represented in the figure as linked letters,
with the letters representing different functions. Bolding indicates primary function. When two
or more components and their functions are identical, they form redundant backups of each
other. Components that differ in structure, but not function, display functional redundancy. A
series of components that back-up some, but not all, of each other’s functions display
degeneracy.

2.5.2 Resistance
Robust processes that are resistant are insensitive to change. Robustness is achieved
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through resistance when the way in which a causal process unfolds is largely unaffected by
changes in initial conditions or background conditions. A system is resistant when it maintains
stability near an equilibrium steady state because it is insensitive to perturbations to the system.
Of all of the types of robust processes and systems that we encounter in our day to day
life, we might be most conceptually familiar with the resistant ones. Stable rigid structures like
steel beams, brick houses, and mechanical watches composed of intricate gears are all resistant
insofar as they are robust to external disturbances. When a response to an external change is
resistant, it is because either the process itself isn’t affected, or if it is affected it doesn’t change
the character of how the process unfolds. This contrasts with redundancy, where a back-up
process kicks in or takes over, and resilience, where the system is changed but can still maintain
its function or bounce back to equilibrium. Microscopic organisms called tardigrades, or water
bears, are a fascinating example of biological resistance at the organism level. When they are in a
suspended metabolic state they can persist for years under tremendous extremes in temperature (200 to 150 C), pressure (vacuums to 1200 atm), dehydration, and radiation (Whitacre 2012).
Resistance is a characteristic of systems that are robust to particular changes because
those changes don’t affect the character or function of the system. One reason is because the
strength of the property or force that is responsible for the stability of the system dominates
changes in the strength of the external forces that typically interact with it. Think again of a steel
beam. Steel beams are largely unaffected by changes to their environment. The chemical bonds
that maintain steel are strong enough that they are not broken by the changes in temperature,
gravity, kinetic forces, etc. that steel normally encounters. This same principle applies to the oak
tree in my previous example. Related to this notion of inactive resistance to strength, is
resistance due to a system’s buffering capacity. Rather than being unaffected by disturbances up
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to a certain magnitude, a system might be able to absorb a certain amount of disturbance without
being affected. Systems that are robust only because of a single dominating force or property
also tend to fail catastrophically if that force is overcome because there is nothing else to
maintain the system’s structure.
Finally, structural features might limit accessibility to the more vulnerable aspects of a
system. Hard shells in many biological organisms help them resist physical forces and
dehydration. The opaque casing of a lock helps make it resistant to picking because it hides
information about how the lock works. Limited and hard to predict emergence times in cicada
insect populations make them resistant to extinction.

2.5.3 Resilience
Resilient processes and systems are characterized by their flexibility. Robustness is
achieved through resilience when there is reliability, but the way in which a causal process
unfolds varies considerably in response to differences or changes in initial or background
conditions. Resilient processes are often marked by their punctuated movement between basins
of attraction in response to disturbances. A resilient system is robust because it is able to
maintain functionality or overall behavior by (1) reorganizing or switching between alternative
stable states or behavioral regimes, or (2) by harnessing the incoming stochastic variation itself
to produce a behavior or maintain functionality.
Complex systems that are resilient have many parts that contribute to system function,
but all of these parts have different roles, and may only weakly interact with each other. When
one part fails or is taken out, the system can compensate for this failure, not by a redundant part
taking over for the failed part, but by reorganizing or compensating in other ways. For example,
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there are cellular metabolic networks containing hundreds of products and reactions with no
redundancy of reaction pathways that are still extremely robust to the elimination of (normally)
central chemical reactions. When individual reactions are eliminated, the networks respond by
spontaneously reorganizing and begin to shuttle the flow of matter through parts of the metabolic
network that were not eliminated.14
Wagner (2005) discusses another example dealing with gene regulation networks. A
study of a fly development model focused on a phenotype that is the product of gene network
containing at least 48 non-redundant biochemical parameters. The researchers found that these
parameters could be changed by an order of magnitude and the network would still maintain its
function. The source of the robustness was again due to the distributed architecture of the
network. In this case, and the one above, the specific path through the network that is taken
depends on the initial conditions and how the network has been disrupted. But no matter the path
taken, the output is the same. Furthermore, the large numbers of distinct, contextually active,
regulatory interactions make it impossible to reduce the origins of this robustness into simple sets
of independent processes, despite the rather simple individual mechanisms making up the
network.15
A second variety of resilience is the result of the stochastic nature of much of the
biological world. Many biological processes are not deterministic at the level of organization at
which they operate. By this I mean that there is not a one-to-one matching between specific input
conditions and the way the process unfolds in order to produce the output of the system. Instead

14
15

See Wagner (2005) for more details on the biology.
A point emphasized by Whitacre (2012).
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the process proceeds and changes in a stochastic fashion. This is different from the example
discussed above. There, differences in the input change how the process unfolds, but this doesn’t
preclude that there is a one-to-one matching between specific inputs and how the process
unfolds. There is process variation between inputs, but not necessarily within replicates of the
same input.
The behavior of processes that take stochastic variation and reliably transform it into
robust end states come in at least two interesting types. The first is exploratory behavior, which
involves repeated selection over a series of subsystem states that are each elaborations of
previously selected states. Exploratory behavior thus requires one process that generates variety
and another process that selects from that variety so it can be fed back in and expanded upon.
Selection may be positive (activation or reinforcement) or negative (inhibition or culling).
Evolution by natural selection is an open-ended process of this type. There are a variety of
biological systems that exhibit exploratory behavior and have a selection mechanism that molds
the behavior for a particular function. When this is the case we can get the robust relation
between input and output even though the process that links the two is not deterministic and may
never look exactly the same. Examples of resilient systems that include exploratory behavior
include: immune systems; microtubule spindle formation; cellular differentiation, proliferation
and apoptosis during development; chemotaxis and cell motility; the formation of neural
connections and vascular growth during development; and behavioral adaptation in complex
species such as predator avoidance, habitat tracking, and adaptive foraging.16
The second type of behavior that harnesses stochastic variation is characterized by

16

Some examples taken from Whitacre (2012).
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random walks and basins of attraction. This type of behavior involves a system that changes over
time according to a random walk. As the system explores the state space open to it, it will
occasionally happen upon important functional states or structural conformations, or be pulled
into a local basin of attraction that will cause the system to drift towards the attractor over time.
By randomly moving through a series of functional states or structural changes that change the
state space open to the system in a directed way (and thus order the functional states) the system
can be made to robustly produce an effect or behavior given enough time. Similarly, a system
can robustly produce an effect or behavior if the basins of attraction that the system moves
through tend to be ordered in some way. Many cellular processes that are subject to
thermodynamic noise (Brownian motion) behave in this manner17. Some robust ecosystems that
are able to return to equilibrium after a disruption might also be fruitfully described in this way.
In this description, the system is knocked away from equilibrium via stochastic disruptions, and
the equilibrium point acts a single global attractor that brings the system back to it over time.
Reviewing, I have tried to show that there are three distinct varieties of robustness:
redundancy, resistance, and resilience. These categories cut across other discussions of
robustness in the scientific and philosophical literature to various degrees. Ecology tends to focus
on resilience and resistance, with some discussion of redundancy in the mechanisms that lead to
resilience. Evo-devo tends to focus on varieties of what I call redundancy and resilience, though
it almost never uses the term resilience. The philosophical literature on robustness is almost
completely silent on any subdivisions of the concept.

See Skillings (2015) for a more detailed look at stochastic mechanisms of this type, such as
ribosome synthesis.
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Robustness isn’t a universal property of a given system or process. When attributing
robustness to a system or process, it is always relative to a particular explanandum and to a
particular variety of disturbance. Systems might also be robust in different ways such that they
are resistant to some changes, resilient to others. Robustness can also be nested in that a system
can be robust in different ways at different levels. A resilient process might be made up of a
network of sub-processes that are each themselves resistant, or have subsystems full of redundant
parts.
Using the notion of nested systems or processes it is possible to describe the differences
between redundancy, resistance, and resilience in another way. Breaking a system down into
subsystems, or a process into sub-processes, and comparing the reliability and relations between
the components to the reliability of the whole will help determine the nature of the robustness of
the overall system. For example, in a resistant system the reliability of the entire system will be
at best as reliable as the least reliable part. This is because the system will break down, if any of
the parts break down. The chain is only as strong as its weakest link.

2.6 Reorienting Towards Robustness
The beginnings of modern science emerged out of the successful and fruitful marriage
between physics and mathematics in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The traditions of
analysis and explanation that later developed in the special sciences were largely inherited from
physics and its applied variants. A tendency to quantify and emphasize the machine-like nature
of the world was to a large degree inherited along with it. It is important in classical physics and
its precursors to redescribe a phenomena in terms of a set of properties and then describe the
invariant relations between the properties that guide the behavior of the whole system. It is
similarly important to identify the dominating forces underlying the production of some
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phenomena, while ignoring those factors that made little to no difference. This type of analysis
lends itself to a picture of the world where everything is pushed and pulled around in a quite
orderly and discrete manner. But this orientation may simply be a remnant of an investigative
approach developed in one area because it was productive and then transferred to another where
it may not always be as useful. Our traditional view of natural systems, therefore, might well be
less a meaningful reality than a perceptual convenience.
Focusing on features like robustness is one way to cash out the perspective that
emphasizes the relations that maintain stability in a world of flux. Looking closely at the details
of scientific practice we find compelling support for highlighting the organizational details that
give rise to robustness. Shifting to this perspective is a powerful tool for gaining a greater
understanding of the world. Moving beyond these observations, I have suggested a framework
for thinking about robustness. Applications of this framework and perspective may also be
helpful with understanding and thinking through other puzzling cases.
The approach inherited from physics of breaking a system into parts and describing them
is insufficient for understanding complex adaptive systems like those found in biology, but it can
provide insights into what makes these systems robust and how. Indeed, a fundamental challenge
for understanding and managing complex systems is to unite the top-down system-level
approach with the more standard bottom-up mechanistic approach. This two-prong approach is
important for increasing our predictive power when moving towards novel future changes such
as ecosystem response to climate change, or using knowledge of developmental processes in one
group to understand how they work elsewhere.
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CHAPTER 3: From an Entangled Bank – Translating and
Interpreting Causation in Biology
3.1 Introduction
The universe is a vast weave of causal influence. For any given event there are a
bafflingly large number of causal interactions involved in bringing about that event. One goal in
the philosophy of causation is to parse this vast network of interactions so that we can pick out
tractable causal descriptions and generate useful causal explanations18. Useful in the sense that
they increase our understanding of broader underlying patterns and serve to increase our
predictive powers or control of the world. Many biological systems differ in important ways
from the physical and chemical systems used as examples in most accounts of explanatory
practice or causal reasoning. Understanding causation in biology comes with a new set of
challenges due largely in part to the fact that the biological world is not only complex, but highly
organized, full of recursion, often historically contingent, and without many widely generalizable
features. On some accounts, biological systems realize a new emergent and distinctive causal
regime beyond those found in purely physical systems (Mossio et al. 2013; Mossio and Bich
2014). In any case, biologists have had to expand their toolset for causal reasoning in order to
deal with peculiarities in the behavior of biological systems.
In this chapter I aim to show how approaches to causal reasoning that have been modeled
on the investigatory procedures that have been successful in the physical sciences (introduced in

My project here takes a view of causal reasoning in the spirit of what Woodward (2014) calls a
functional approach to causation. As opposed to projects in the philosophy of causation that are
focused on metaphysics, descriptions of ordinary usage, or how causal claims fit with
fundamental physics, the functional approach evaluates causation in terms of its usefulness for
particular projects, such as explanation or description.
18
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Section 3.2) can, in some situations, obscure the complex causal relations present in many
biological systems. The situation can be especially problematic when exporting causal
explanations for use in different domains or at other scales. I introduce two related problems in
this paper: the causal translation problem and the causal interpretation problem. I believe these
problems are best illustrated by working through biological examples in detail.
I introduce the causal translation problem in Section 3.3 by contrasting the causal
features of the “nanoworld” inside living cells with the causal features of our everyday world-the world of “moderate-sized specimens of dry goods”, as J.L. Austin puts it (Austin 1962: 8).
The translation problem refers to the mismatch that comes from applying causal reasoning
strategies that are successful in one domain to a different inappropriate domain. The resulting
problems stem from the fact that the causal interactions in the systems of interest differ too much
and so make comparisons or analogies between them only marginally useful, if not downright
misleading.
The interpretation problem has to do with the difficulty in applying the simplifying
assumptions necessary for tractability while still adequately capturing the causal structures of
complex systems (Section 3.4). The tradeoff between tractability and adequacy can make it
difficult to interpret the underlying causal structure of the system of interest. Problems emerge
when oversimplified accounts are treated as accurate depictions, more often than not by nonspecialists using those accounts for other purposes. I illustrate this problem by examining work
on complex biological systems featuring properties such as low modularity, recursive
hierarchical organization, self-maintenance, self-production, and high degrees of robustness.
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3.2 History and Approaches
The contours of the history of debates about causation and scientific explanation are well
explored in the philosophical and historical literature (references). In this chapter I will focus on
some of the conceptual tools useful for causal reasoning. Causal reasoning about the world
depends on finding a way to pick out the most salient cause(s) of the phenomenon of interest.
This process takes many forms, including but not limited to: abstraction (the removal of
irrelevant details), idealization (the introduction of explanatorily beneficial falsehoods),
reduction (focusing on smaller or more fundamental parts), and decomposition (breaking down a
system into modular constituent parts). Simplification via these methods is useful because they
help with tractability, can increase our control of the world by revealing ways to effectively
intervene on it, can aid in prediction, can reveal underlying generalities, and can help with
understanding.
Causal reasoning in the special sciences emerged out of a scientific tradition of analysis
and explanation that held up mathematical and dynamical models of phenomena as exemplars19.
Mathematical approaches have been the most successful in the physical sciences, especially
mechanics and chemistry. This is in part due to the fact that there are a lot of phenomena in these
fields that allow for strong simplifying assumptions. This may be due to the fact that the
behavior of the system of interest is dominated by relatively few forces or properties (e.g.,
inertia, friction, density, etc.) or that the system is homogenous and/or is analyzed at the scale
where the micro-behavior of its components can be averaged out (e.g., pressure, temperature,

In this chapter I don’t make a strong distinction between causal reasoning and causal
explanation. I take it that a particular form of causal reasoning is justified insofar as it can be
used produce adequate causal explanations.
19
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speed, stoichiometry, etc.). Systems with such properties can be modeled in highly abstract or
idealized ways, often resulting in models that are easily understood yet still offer a great deal of
predictive power and an increased control over the world.20
As the complexity of the system increases, this (relatively) straightforward approach to
science begins to be less practical and less successful.21 Relative to physics and chemistry,
biological systems are made up of an enormous number of interacting and diverse parts that are
organized in a hierarchical fashion. This makes their full tractability through mathematical
models quite difficult, if not impossible, in practice. Explanatory practice adjusted and expanded
in response to the continued investigation of the types of complex systems found in biology and
the rest of the special sciences. An increased focus on isolating and describing particular causal
relations, as opposed to mathematical description and subsuming phenomena under laws, was a
large part of this change.
Abstraction and idealization are still very important in causal explanation, but they don’t
necessarily lead to mathematical models of the system. Interventionist accounts of causation,
focused on prediction and an increased control of the world, are especially suited to the sciences
and will serve as my example. On an interventionist account of causation, such as the one
presented in Woodward (2003), causal relations are defined in terms of relations between
variables, such that intervening and changing the value of one variable changes the value of the
second variable. According to the interventionist conception of causation, causal information

I will not take a view here about whether or not these mathematical models identify, or stand in
as descriptions of, the causal structure of some part of the world. The relation between causal and
mathematical explanations is fraught with controversy.
21
See Moreno et al. (2010) for a more detailed history of the impact of complexity analysis on
the sciences.
20
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provides answers to what-if-things-had-been-different questions. Causal explanations identify
conditions under which an outcome would have been different, that is, they identify changes that
can be made to manipulate the outcome of interest.
This approach proceeds by picking out and isolating a particular system or phenomenon.
Assumptions are made about what the components of the system are and how they interact. This
aids in the identification of relevant variables and abstraction away from irrelevant details. Then
relations between variables are determined through observation or experimentation. Causal
models can then be constructed, with their accuracy (and the justification of initial variable
choices) usually evaluated in terms of predictive power and generality. Woodward (2010)
describes three concepts that are especially important for picking out the appropriate causal
variables in biological systems: stability, proportionality, and specificity. Stability refers to the
degree to which a causal relationship continues to hold under a wide range of background
conditions. Proportionality refers to picking variables with the right amount of detail along the
particular-general continuum. Specificity is the extent to which a causal relation approximates to
the ideal of one cause-one effect. All other things being equal, causal explanations are better to
the extent that the cited models are detailed, complete, and accurate in the sense of identifying
the full range of changes in all those factors (and only those factors) that are associated with
changes in the target phenomenon (Woodward 2003, 2010).
Decomposition also plays a crucial role in causal reasoning in biology because the causal
interactions making up most biological systems are too numerous or complex to investigate as a
whole. Decomposition is the strategy of breaking systems into their component modular parts,
investigating those parts separately, and then trying to figure out how the parts interact with each
other and within the system as a whole (Simon 1962; Bechtel and Richardson 1993/2010; Levy
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2014). A component part is modular if the difference it makes is independent of the difference
made by other components. That is, component X’s contribution is modular if it is possible to
disrupt the activity of other components without affecting the contribution of X (Woodward
2003, 2013; Levy 2014).
Decomposition may proceed along structural, functional, or temporal lines and is often an
iterative process because systems are almost always themselves part of larger-scale systems and
made up of smaller-scale ones. Decomposition is especially important in biology because the
parts of a biological system are often heterogeneous and highly organized. This is unlike some of
the traditional targets of the physical sciences, such as gases and medium-size solids and fluids,
where the global behavior of the parts can be averaged out and (relatively) straight-forward
connections between hierarchical levels can be made.
Decompositional strategies lay at the heart of mechanistic approaches to explanation
(Bechtel and Richardson 1993/2010; Machamer et al. 2000; Levy 2014; Skillings 2015).
Mechanistic explanations explain by decomposing a phenomenon or process of interest and
mapping out the relations of the entities and activities that produce the phenomenon or process.
Mechanistic explanations typically answer how questions: “how does a particular phenomenon
come about?”, or “how is a particular function realized?”.
Mechanist and interventionist approaches are seen by some to go hand-in-hand, with the
details of mechanisms and complex systems gathered via an interventionist approach (Craver
2007: 160). On this view complex systems can be decomposed into mechanisms, and parts of
mechanisms and their interactions can be described via experimental interventions. Moving in
the other direction, the details of systems and mechanisms (in at least some cases) can be
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abstracted away from and instantiated as variables in a more general interventionist causal
description of a larger scale system.
I take the story as given so far to be a basic sketch of the explanatory strategies used to
investigate the causal structure of the world. It, of course, leaves out a majority of the details,
such as the underlying metaphysics of causality, how causal relations are experimentally
verified, and how causal knowledge is used for prediction. According to this minimal picture, the
strategies for discovering causal relations and generating tractable causal explanations are
captured by the interaction of two approaches to simplification: the omission of irrelevant details
through abstraction and idealization, and the decomposition of a system in order to highlight its
underlying organization and break it up into more independently manageable subsystems.
Ideally, causal explanations could be generated in-principle for all phenomena via iteration of
these two strategies. When the behavior of a system is straightforward, abstract away to the
salient causal factors. If the behavior is too complex, keep on decomposing it into more
manageable parts until you get to a system tractable enough to where you can abstract away to
the salient causal factors. Then recompose as needed. Unfortunately, this traditional line of
causal reasoning runs into problems when applied to the behavior of many biological systems.
The rest of the paper is concerned with showing why this is the case.

3.3 Translating the Causal Storms of the Nanoworld
The explosion of progress in biophysics, molecular biology and genetics in the last few
decades has painted a new picture of the inner workings of the living world. One striking feature
of the biomolecular processes that underlie all biological phenomena is that they behave in a way
that is quite different from the behavior seen in the macro level processes experienced in our
everyday lives. I maintain that because of this our causal explanatory habits have the potential to
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seriously mislead us when thinking about the small-scale features of the biological world, which
in turn might cascade into other problems elsewhere.
The difficulty is an instance of what I call the causal translation problem. It refers to
situations where strategies of causal reasoning useful in one domain or scale are transferred to
another domain or scale where they are not appropriate and/or applicable. This may be because
of the simplifying assumptions used to make each domain tractable are not easy to translate
between. Or, it may be that the systems behave too differently, making it difficult to integrate
descriptions or explanations across scales.22 I will further illustrate the causal translation
problem by means of a contrastive example.
Consider two processes: the time-keeping of a mechanical clock and the synthesis of a
protein by a ribosomal complex. One way to explain how they work is look at how their parts
interact. What are the causal interactions of the parts that make up each process like? How
should they be described? The workings of a mechanical clock are likely more familiar than
those of a ribosomal complex. The mainspring stores mechanical energy through torsion. The
interaction between the mainspring and the balance wheel via the escapement mechanism turn
the gears at a fixed rate. These gears are attached to the rotating hands of the clock face, which
indicate the time.
We can say a few more things about the mechanism of a watch. It is robust process
relative to a wide variety of background conditions, including many changes in size, temperature,
gravity, light etc. The parts can be made out of a wide variety of materials. Furthermore, changes

22

This is similar to the problem Batterman calls “the tyranny of scales” (Batterman 2013).
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in these variables will change very little about the way in which the process unfolds. There will
likely be miniscule changes in the friction and elastic stresses where the parts interact—as a
result of different metal hardness or strength, for example--but to a great extent all of the parts
will interact in approximately the same way across a wide spectrum of conditions.
Protein synthesis is the process by which a ribosome constructs a new protein from amino
acids in an order directed by a mRNA. A ribosomal complex has parts, but the parts don’t stand
in the same relations as the parts of a mechanical clock. Imagine we are studying a population of
100 identical ribosomes that are all synthesizing the same type of protein. When we compare
what each ribosome did in the synthesis process we will almost certainly see a large amount of
variation across runs. To understand why this is, we have to take a detour through molecular and
cellular biology.

3.3.1 The World Inside the Cell
Protein synthesis is a well understood cellular mechanism. It is an incredibly reliable
process. The error rate is on the order of 1 in 10,000. This regularity in production is one reason
why ribosomes are thought of as tiny molecular machines. Zooming in to the level of individual
ribosomes and individual cycles of protein synthesis reveals a much different world compared to
what we are used to seeing in macroscopic phenomena. Let’s look at what the world inside the
cell is like.23

In this section I draw on recent work in cellular biology, molecular biology, biochemistry and
biophysics, especially Peter Moore’s paper “How should we think about the ribosome?” (2012),
Dean Astumian and Peter Hänggi’s paper “Brownian Motors” (2002), and Peter Hoffman’s book
Life’s Ratchet (2012). Additional issues are explored in Skillings (2015) “Mechanistic
explanation of biological processes”.
23
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The interior of a cell is a crowded place, packed full of proteins, DNA, RNA, lipids and
various other organic molecules. The scale at which these molecules exist is measured in
nanometers—billionths of a meter. Physical interactions inside the cell are remarkably different
from physical interactions at our scale because the relevant physical forces are quite different at
each level. As volumes become small, forces associated with mass become less important and
surface interactions start to dominate. Forces that are important at the macroscale, such as gravity
and inertia, become irrelevant at the nanoscale. Likewise, forces that dominate at the nanoscale,
such as friction, electromagnetic attraction and thermal forces, are much less important at the
macroscale. For example: in a baseball game, inertia (when the bat hits the ball) and gravity
(when the ball comes back down) dominate. Typically, the ball does not stick to the bat. In a
game of nanobaseball, however, inertia and gravity would be unimportant, as the ball would
have a mass of next to nothing. But the relatively large surface area compared with the tiny mass
of the nanobaseball would make it difficult to get the nanobaseball off the nanobat24.
Another important feature of the cell at the nanoscale is the fact that it is a liquid water
environment. Every molecule in a cell is constantly barraged by fast-moving water molecules.
Larger molecules, like proteins, are randomly struck by a water molecule trillions of times per
second. These constant collisions add up to a lot of power--relatively speaking. At body
temperature a thermal noise power of about 10-8 W continually swirls around a protein. That
force is approximately a hundred million times greater than the force that a protein like a
ribosome can generate. These thermal forces, coupled with the electrical charge, cause larger
molecules to vibrate, move about, and constantly and spontaneously rearrange themselves.

24

This example is based on one used in Hoffman (2012)
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Hoffman calls this chaotic environment the molecular storm. For molecules, moving in a
directed way under their own power would be more difficult than walking through a tornado is
for us. Unlike a macrolevel storm though, the molecular storm has no directionality. Every water
molecule collision comes from a random direction.
The nanoscale is special in one final way. Only at the nanoscale are many types of
energy--such as elastic, mechanical, electrostatic, chemical, and thermal—at the same
magnitude. This means that an appropriately structured molecule can spontaneously convert
different types of energy into one another. A molecule like a ribosome can go through substantial
fluctuations in energy as thermal energy randomly waxes and wanes. When the thermal energy
randomly crosses a threshold, the ribosome can use it to convert, for example, chemical energy
into electrical or directed kinetic energy. At smaller scales, such as at the scale of atoms or
subatomic particles, binding energies are too large to be subject to thermal energy fluctuations.
By contrast, at scales much larger than a nanometer, it is the mechanical and electrical energies
that are too high to be subject to thermal fluctuations.
Let’s now return to the process of protein synthesis. Because of the nature of events at the
nanoscale, the parts of a biochemical mechanism don’t interact in the same way as the parts of a
machine mechanism at the macro-level. Ribosomes are the prototypical example of a group
known as Brownian machines, which are now thought to be ubiquitous at the cellular level
(Dashti et al. 2014). Brownian machines are macromolecular complexes buffeted by the random
motions of molecules in the environment, and they are capable of exploiting these thermal
motions to do work. 99.99% of the activity in protein elongation is random fluctuation that has
nothing to do with function, and most of the progress through the protein elongation cycle is
driven by changes in relative free energies coming from conformational state changes and the
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presence of protein factors that promote some states over others (Moore 2012). This means that
the ribosome is randomly pushed into different conformational states by external forces, rather
than moving in sequence according to the activity and interactions of its parts.25 A protein gets
synthesized as the ribosome is pushed around and randomly visits functional conformations.
Given enough time, the ribosome will eventually cycle through all of the functional states that
are required to synthesize a protein. Moore (2012) states that: “[A]ll the functionally significant
movements of the ribosome, both internal and external, are biased random walks, and it is most
unlikely that any given ribosome will ever do exactly the same thing twice as it elongates some
polypeptide”.
If we were to trace all of the movements of a ribosome during protein synthesis, it is
unlikely that we would trace the same path twice when comparing across events. We won’t
observe a regular succession of events across instances like we would if we were observing the
inner workings of a mechanical watch. This is an important difference in the causal behaviors
between different scales in that it conflicts with a central intuition about the behavior of causal
chains. “Obviously, as a general rule, more distal causal relationships with many intermediate
links will be less stable than the individual links themselves” (Woodward 2010: 294). The search
for the stable relationships that are in turn held up as the important causal factors will tend to
drive in a “reductive” direction for more fine-grained details, “a search for the more proximate

Biomolecules at the nanoscale are a perfect example appear to be a perfect example of what
Wimsatt calls “causal thickets”, which are systems characterized by large degree of cross-level
interaction (Wimsatt 1994). According to Wimsatt, causal thickets pop up when the system of
interest is at the interface of two scales. This makes it difficult to give a single causal description
of the system’s behavior. The two scales here being that of the protein complex and that of the
water molecules whose aggregate behavior is abstracted as thermal energy at the level of the
macromolecule.
25
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relationships that mediate distal relationships”. Woodward admits that this isn’t always the case,
but the example above suggests that there are large groups of important processes where this
doesn’t hold. In the case of protein synthesis the entire process is very stable, and the visitation
of intermediate functional conformations perhaps even more so, but the even more proximate
movements between functional conformations are stochastic and not stably ordered at all.
There is no regular ribosome movement, and this isn’t because the world is messy. It is
not the case that under ideal conditions we would get identical protein synthesis events. That is
how the watch works. Under ideal conditions and an identical starting position the watch
behaves the same way every time. Protein synthesis is itself stochastic, there are no ideal
conditions under which we could remove variation. A ribosome that didn’t have its movement
dominated by external stochastic forces would not do anything at all, because that environment
would only exist at 0 Kelvin, an environment where there is no biological activity. If you remove
the source of the variation, the process itself fails. We could never predict the precise movements
of a particular ribosome given past observations of other ribosomes, or even past observations of
that exact ribosome.
An abstract functional explanation tells us a lot about protein synthesis, but it leaves out
the details of how those functions are connected26. Moore makes a similar claim. The central
thrust of his paper is the claim that if an explanation “of elongation is not to be totally
misleading, it must depict the endless series of meaningless, thermally driven, conformational
fluctuations that separate one functionally significant event from the next” (Moore 2012). He
recommends that we “come to think of the ribosome as the dynamic, constantly varying structure

26

Refer back to chapter 1 and (Skillings 2015) for further discussion of this point.
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it is and always was” and move away from quasi-mechanical explanations for the properties of
ribosomes and “instead seek to understand them in terms of the particle’s conformational energy
landscape” (Moore 2012).
A functional explanation of protein synthesis involves the determination of a complex
mechanism, much like the explanation of a mechanical clock. Each mechanism is linear, and the
parts interact in a direct and fixed way. But if we look at the process by which an actual protein
is produced, the similarities between a watch and a ribosome begin to evaporate. The functional
explanation covers up the important ways in which a ribosome is different from a watch27. There
is no productive continuity between stages, where earlier functional events directly produce later
functional events. Rather, protein synthesis proceeds stochastically. Watches reliably tell time,
and ribosomes reliably produce proteins, but the relations between the temporal stages of the
mechanisms are much different. A watch has a fixed structure and operates in a fixed sequence.
The behavior of molecular machines is explained in terms of their free-energy landscape. The
parts of the ribosome are constantly in motion and randomly changing their relations to each
other due to forces that dominate at the molecular level. These ongoing interactions are what
dynamically stabilize the ribosome even as it flows constantly from conformation to
conformation in a biased random walk. Furthermore, it is this constant change that leads to the
functionally important states needed for protein synthesis. Knowing this is critical for
understanding how the ribosome synthesizes proteins.

27

This may be a general downside of cashing out explanations solely in terms of functions. Not
knowing the details of how the function is realized limits our ability to carry out interventions,
predict the effects of perturbations, and generally answer what-if-things-had-been-different
questions.
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Biological systems at the macroscopic scale, such as organs and tissues within an
organism, tend to behave more like machines. Parts interact by pushing and pulling on each,
because at that level the forces that generate Brownian motion are ineffective. The fact that many
biological systems can be approximated in such a way made the organism-as-a-machine
assumption a very powerful conceptual approach. Upon closer investigation, and especially at
smaller scales, the machine metaphor rapidly shakes apart. Ribosomes and other molecular
machines don’t behave like macroscopic mechanical devices. Using them as analogies for one
another is misleading. Any conclusions about one system will probably be inaccurate if they are
based on an analogy of how the system at the other scale acts28. The causal behaviors of these
systems do not directly translate back and forth.

3.3.2 Re-imagining the physical basis of the mind
Increased awareness of differences in the behavior of biological systems could also
change the shape of other persistent problems outside of biology. For example, Peter GodfreySmith argues that the behavior of metabolic and cellular processes forces us to rethink the socalled “explanatory gap”29 problem, which hinges on intuitions about how subjective experience
might arise from physical systems (Godfrey-Smith 2016). Conceivability arguments against
materialism depend on intuitions about the separability of the mental and the physical. 30 This
argument states that it seems like we can conceive of an exact physical duplicate that is the same

This point is echoed in (Astumian et al. 2016): “A complete understanding of the mechanism
of a molecular motor can be gained only by viewing the chemo-mechanical cycles holistically.
Experiments on parts of the cycle can fill in the details, but over-interpretation often leads to
erroneous conclusions, especially when analogies are drawn with macroscopic elements”.
29
See Levine J. 1983. Materialsim and qualia: the explanatory gap. Pacific Philosophical
Quarterly LXIV. October:354-361.
30
For example: Nagel, Kripke, and Chalmers
28
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in every way to that of an ordinary human excepting for it not having any subjective experience.
This is supposed to show that the mental and physical are separable, and hence the failure of
materialism. This argument depends on some crucial intuitions about the physical behavior of
biological systems. Intuitions that probably don’t match the actual behavior of those systems.
Godfrey-Smith writes:
In us, the material basis for mental activity is tied to cells and metabolism. When we look
at what's actually going on in our bodies and brains, we find that many of the imaginatively
familiar features of the physical are not present. Many of the features of the physical that strike
our imagination in a way that seems un-mental are not present. And it is difficult to imagine the
crucial processes at all, hard to get any sort of intuitive handle on what they are capable of.
Arguments against materialism based on conceivability rely on the trustworthiness of intuitions
about what the particular physical processes inside us can produce. Once we see what those
physical processes are actually like, the trustworthiness of the crucial intuitions is much reduced.
(Godfrey-Smith 2015)
Redescribing this in my terminology: conceivability arguments against materialism
require dependable intuitions about the behavior of small-scale biological processes and how
they are related to higher-level processes such as perception, consciousness and subjective
experience. But, our causal reasoning habits have been formed through experience with the
macro-world and likely don’t translate very well to thinking through complex systems and causal
interactions at the scale of cells, where things behave much differently. The onus is on those
arguing for the trustworthiness of our intuitions to show that the causal translation problem has
been overcome.
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3.4 Interpreting Complexity in Living Systems
I now turn to what I call the causal interpretation problem. Many biological systems are
complicated in a way that goes beyond the complexity seen in the systems studied by the
physical sciences. Biological systems have many features absent in non-living complex systems:
hierarchical organization, long-term sustainability, historicity, functional diversity, adaptivity
and agency. Living systems exist in nested and interconnected levels which, being somewhat
self-organized in their local dynamics, depend globally upon each other (Moreno et al. 2009,
Moreno and Mossio 2015). Living systems are not just more of the same, they are qualitatively
different. My claim (echoing others31) is that living systems present a new type of causal regime.
The causal interpretation problem stems from the difficulty in producing causal descriptions of
these systems that are both adequate and tractable at the same time.32
Here are three sources of causal complexity:
(1) a large number of interactions in a system,
(2) differences in the kinds of interactions between parts of the system,
(3) constraints placed by the system as a whole on the interactions of the parts of the system.
Interpreting the causal structure of a system becomes increasingly difficult as these three
sources of complexity interact. Many biological systems exemplify this through their high
number of components, interacting in non-linear ways while constrained or channeled by the
global properties of the system. This introduces a holism in the system (Mitchell 2009; Moreno

For example: Bechtel 2007; Mossio et al. 2013; Mossio and Bich 2014.
The causal interpretation problem shares similarities with Sara Green’s diagnosis of the
difficulties in explicating the structures and capacities of complex system. Where I collapse all
these difficulties under one label, she divides them into what she calls the synchronic and
diachronic underdetermination problems (Green 2015).
31
32
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et al. 2009), in the sense that decomposition of the system into its parts is either not possible, or
comes with a loss in regards to understanding the behavior of the system as a whole because the
behavior of the system is not an aggregation of the behavior of its parts.
If decomposability and modularity are required for investigating the causal contribution
of individual parts to a system’s behavior (such as Woodward 2003), then an interpretation of the
causal behavior of a complex system becomes problematic. A component may have a causal
role when the system is in an undisrupted state, but have a different, or no, causal role when the
system is in a perturbed state, such as when the system is manipulated and decomposed for
experimental purposes (Mitchell 2009).
Self-maintaining and self-producing systems, such as cells and some regulatory networks,
are particularly complex and often the most resistant to decompositional strategies. Many feature
dynamical causal loops, such that, at least one system-level property (itself the product of the
interactions of the parts) is causally necessary for the maintenance of the loop (Bechtel and
Richardson (1993/2010; Mitchell 2009). When the interactions between component parts change
their structure and dynamics when the system is decomposed into sub-systems for isolated study
(a practical necessity), then this can affect inferences about their stability and characteristic
function when put back together (Simon 1962; Moreno et al. 2009). This makes it difficult to
understand the causal interactions of the system because you can’t study the parts in isolation
without disrupting the workings of the entire system.
Braun and Marom (2015) highlight additional features that add to the difficulty of
decomposing biological systems. First, nearly identical microscopic configurations can give rise
to different macroscale dynamics and functions, and different microscopic configurations can
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give rise to the same macroscale dynamics33. There is a many-to-many degeneracy in system
function. This makes an interventionist approach to causal explanation a lot less powerful. In
systems with many-to-many degeneracy, seeing no effect when a variable is manipulated doesn’t
mean that the variable isn’t causally contributing to the behavior of the system. Other parts of the
system could be compensating34. Second, there is no time scale separation between the levels of
organization and so systems can’t be decomposed according to the speed of their interactions.
Smaller processes almost always occur at faster rates than larger-scale processes. The difference
in interaction speeds between scales is one of the most fruitful decompositional approaches for
organizing the behavior of physical sciences. It is less helpful in biological systems.
The complexity and robustness of holistic biological systems frustrates attempts to
simplify them and make them tractable while maintaining a high degree of accuracy or
usefulness. The causal interpretation problem is meant to capture this fact. A complete
description of all of the salient causal factors and their interactions inside a complex holistic
system would almost certainly be too unwieldy to be useful. Abstracting away from too many of
the causal factors in these systems can make the resulting description useless for predicting the
behavior of the system or intervening on it. Possibly the most pernicious aspect of this problem
comes from the difficulty of deciphering whether or not one has accurately captured the causal
relations between the parts of such complex holistic systems at all.
Systems biology is one new field focused on understanding the complexity of holistic

33

Lewontin (1970, 1974) makes this same point when talking about many-to-many genotypephenotype mapping.
34
See reviews by Nijhout (2002), Kitano (2004), Wagner (2005), Bateson and Gluckman (2012),
Whitacre (2012), and chapter 2 for discussion of robustness in biological systems.
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systems (Kitano 2007, Green 2015). This approach attempts to determine how systems-level
properties, such as functional properties, arise by non-linear interactions between the component
parts.35 One way to do this is by finding common network architectures in the organization of
complex systems that help explain why the systems behave the way that they do. There has been
some success in finding some network motifs, such as the small-world networks and bow-tie
networks common to robust systems (Kitano 2004; Whitacre 2012; Green 2015).

3.5 Causal Reasoning in Biology Redux
Abstraction and decomposition are powerful and probably indispensable conceptual tools
for reducing the complexity of natural systems to a degree where tractable descriptions and
explanations can be given. But, in the end, I suggest they are best viewed as heuristics (Wimsatt
2007). The heuristic viewpoint shows why it is important to pay attention to both how our
conceptual tools resolve problems and when and where they can break down. The causal
translation problem and the causal interpretation problem capture two types of scenarios where
abstraction and decomposition have a greater tendency to break down. Causal explanations
constructed in domain-specific ways may be adequate for meeting prediction or manipulation
goals in that domain (or at least adequate stand-ins for explanations in-progress), but they can be
very misleading in other contexts if not applied with care. Decomposing phenomena as if they
are machines can be an efficient method for understanding macro-scale phenomena, but is
usually counterproductive for understanding phenomena at the nano-scale. Paying close attention
to biological practice and theorizing is an important preventative measure for avoiding the

35

Refer back to Chapter 2 for further discussion of systems biology approaches, especially in the
context of the importance of robustness for the persistence of complex systems.
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problems with adequately translating and interpreting causal relations in biology.
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INTERMEZZO
The dissertation so far has focused on some of the strategies that we use to try and
understand the biological world. It has argued that the complexity of living systems challenges
the adequacy of traditional approaches to scientific explanation because currently dominant
theories of scientific explanation don’t adequately track the explanations given in the biological
sciences. My project has been then to show how the details of the biological world motivates an
expansion of our considered accounts of scientific explanation. I have also shown how the
empirical investigation of living things give us reason to be doubtful of our casual intuitions and
our causal reasoning habits.
When considering complex phenomena, or phenomena at scales vastly different than our
own, it is important to keep in mind how our intuitions might lead us astray. Our causal
reasoning habits have been formed in response to a world experienced at a medium scale. Things
behave in an unusual way at the microscopic and nano scales. Getting access to those worlds has
challenged our understanding of how living systems operate.
The next chapter moves away from broad questions about explanation in biology to zoom
in on an active debate within biology. Which entities are biological individuals, and how should
they be characterized? A fundamental question within biology, if there are any. Though the
material found in this chapter may appear to be disparate at first glance, two background themes
that have emerged as running through the project so far are also to be found here. The first is a
question: what are the appropriate conceptual and theoretical tools for understanding the living
world? The first three chapters look at broad frameworks (mechanistic explanation, robustness
and system-level explanation, causal reasoning), the next chapter focuses more narrowly on
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theories of biological individuality. The second theme is a focus on how the empirical
investigation of the microscopic and nano worlds has put into question the assumptions of
dominant theories used to understand the biological world.
In the first three chapters I used details about the inner workings of cells to argue for a
change in how we think about living systems more generally. In the next chapter I investigate
whether the details of microbial interactions should change how we think about biological
individuals, including how we think about ourselves. In these ways chapter four is a continuation
of the first three chapters. It is a case study where the broader themes are demonstrated through
wading in on an ongoing debate about how to understand the evolution and interactions of living
things.
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CHAPTER 4: Holobionts and the Ecology of Organisms –
Multi-Species Communities or Integrated Individuals?36
4.1 Introduction
Multicellular organisms have been engaged in symbiotic relationships with
microorganisms throughout their evolutionary history (Moran 2006). It was long thought that all
macroorganisms are routinely colonized by a large number of microorganisms, but the details
and extent of macrobe-microbe interactions remained difficult to uncover. As molecular
sequencing technologies have advanced, the microbial world has been increasingly opened up to
investigation by biologists. It is now widely accepted that microorganisms have always played−
and still continue to play−many important roles in the lives of plants and animals (McFall-Ngai
et al. 2013, Douglas and Werren 2016). Symbiotic interactions between microbes and macrobes
have been documented among diverse organisms, and many researchers maintain that all
macrobes engage in symbiotic interactions with microbes in natural settings (Zilber-Rosenberg
and Rosenberg 2008; Bosch and McFall-Ngai 2011; Dupré and O’Malley 2009; Gordon et al.
2013; Singh et al. 2013; Booth 2014).
The term “holobiont” was coined by Lynn Margulis and used to refer to symbiotic
associations that last throughout a significant portion of an organism’s lifetime (Margulis 1991).
The term first found wide usage in coral biology where it was defined as a coral colony and its
associated photosynthetic algal symbionts and bacterial communities (Rohwer et al. 2002;
Knowlton and Rohwer 2003; Stat et al. 2012). The recent influx of interest in macrobe-microbe

This chapter was published as: Skillings D. 2016. Holobionts and the ecology of organisms:
multi-species communities or integrated individuals? Biology & Philosophy.
doi:10.1007/s10539-016-9544-0.
36
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relations has led to a proliferation of the term “holobiont”, now most often understood as a host
macroorganism and all of its associated microbiota, including bacteria, archaea, viruses, protists,
fungi, and microscopic multicellular animals such as nematodes (Zilber-Rosenberg and
Rosenberg 2008; Booth 2014; Bordenstein and Theis 2015; Moran and Sloan 2015; Douglas and
Werren 2016; Theis et al. 2016). Because the holobiont includes all associated microbiota, the
interactions between holobiont partners may be harmful, beneficial or of no consequence.
Relationships between partners may be coevolved or opportunistic, competitive or cooperative.
Recognition that holobionts are common in nature has led many researchers to reassess
their views about various processes and concepts that are foundational in biological thinking.
Dupré and O’Malley (2009) was an important early step in this direction, suggesting that
microbial biology has radical implications for the future development of many areas of
philosophy of biology. Philosophers are not alone here. They are joined by biologists in calling
for a transformation in our thinking. “Right now, for those of us who are not evolutionary
biologists, it is enough to recognize that the very foundations of biology are being shaken by
both the integration of microbiology into concepts of macroevolution and the recognition that
host-microbe symbioses are a major theme in biological systems” (McFall-Ngai 2016). One
suggestion is that there is now a need to “upgrade fundamental theories” because holobiont
systems “raise the discussion of individuality and organismality beyond its historical perspective
to a level that challenges and extends current thinking” (Bordenstein and Theis 2015).
Criteria for individuating entities are of central importance in biology (Hull 1978, 1980,
1992; Buss 1987; Godfrey-Smith 2009, 2013; Clark 2011; Pradeu 2012). For example,
population biologists and ecologists must be able to distinguish individuals in a population.
Evolutionary biologists must be able to distinguish parents from their offspring, and one lineage
90

from another. Immunologists and physiologists must be able to distinguish between an individual
and its environment. Organisms have long been the paradigm of individuality—a horse, a tree, a
human--both within and outside of biology (Aristotle 1984). Extensive experimentation and
theoretical advances in biology, especially within the last century, have changed our
understanding of how individuals can and did evolve (Buss 1987; Maynard Smith and Szathmáry
1995; Michod 1999). New conceptions of individuality have helped us to understand
individuality across the biological hierarchy: genes, cells, multicellular organisms,
superorganismal colonies, and multi-species symbiotic communities (Dawkins 1976; Sober and
Wilson 1989; Queller and Strassmann 2009).
The question motivating this chapter is: are holobionts biological individuals or
communities? I start by introducing the biology of the coral holobiont as an example of the
complexity and diversity of the interactions within a holobiont. I take the coral holobiont to be a
good example of typical holobiont dynamics, and as such an appropriate test case for working
through whether or not holobionts are biological individuals. In the following sections I expand
on relevant accounts of biological individuality and claims made in favor of holobionts being
biological individuals. I then consider whether holobionts meet some plausible and common
criteria for either evolutionary individuality (reproduction and heritability) or organismality
(functionally integrated interactors, metabolic collaboration, or cooperative low-conflict
consortiums). I conclude that most holobionts share more affinities with communities than they
do with individual wholes, and that, except for in rare and possibly unrealized cases, holobionts
do not meet the criteria for being evolutionary individuals, units of selection, or organisms.

4.2 The Coral Holobiont
The evolutionary and ecological success of corals in the characteristically nutrient-poor
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environments of tropical and subtropical oceans is thought to be a direct consequence of their
ability to form mutually beneficial symbioses with unicellular photoautotrophic dinoflagellates in
the genus Symbiodinium, commonly referred to as zooxanthellae (Stat et al. 2012; Lesser et al.
2013). The appearance of coral reefs in the Triassic has been attributed to the evolution of the
symbiotic association between the coral host and Symbiodinium.
Corals are mainly colonized by free-living Symbiodinium from the environment, but a
direct transfer of Symbiodinium from parent to offspring via inclusion in the egg also occurs in
many brooding corals, and is occasionally seen in some spawning corals (Thompson et al. 2015).
The Symbiodinium are endosymbionts that reside within the cells of the coral host. They fix
carbon through photosynthesis, which they provide, along with other nutrients, to their host in
return for host waste metabolites and protection from grazing (Stat et al. 2012; Roth 2014). This
exchange of nutrients is mutually beneficial and helps the coral secrete the calcium carbonate
skeletal structure that is shared by the coral colony and contributes to the formation of coral
reefs. This endosymbiotic association is especially interesting because it involves two eukaryotic
organisms and the genome of the symbiont is three times larger than the genome of its host (Roth
2014).
The total number of bacterial species associated with corals remain largely unknown, but
recent estimates put the number between 3000-6000 species (Stat et al. 2012). At least some of
the coral-associated prokaryotes are beneficial to the coral host. Cyanobacteria provide nutrition
through nitrogen fixation (Lesser et al., 2004), and bacteria residing in the coral’s exterior
mucous layer act as a first line of defense against pathogens by producing antimicrobial
compounds and occupying space (Stat et al. 2012). Most coral-associated fungi and viruses are
thought to be parasitic (Golubic et al. 2005), but there may be exceptions. There is evidence that
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some endolithic fungi residing in the coral skeleton could be converting nitrate and nitrite to
ammonia which could enable fixed nitrogen to cycle within the coral holobiont, and some of the
bacteriophages might be helping to beneficially regulate associated bacterial communities
(Wegley et. al. 2007). With rare exceptions, the microorganismal component of the coral
holobiont is obtained from the environment (Apprill et al. 2009).
There is a substantial amount of genetic diversity within Symbiodinium and evidence that
some of it is reflected as functional diversity. This is important because corals can harbor more
than one type of Symbiodinium at a time, and are known to shuffle and switch out their
Symbiodinium types. The coral holobiont is very sensitive to changes in ocean temperature and
lives close to their upper thermal tolerance limit. A prolonged temperature increase of as little as
1 ˚C causes stress and can lead to coral bleaching, the forceful expulsion of the Symbiodinium by
the coral host. The coral holobiont is a dynamic system with members fluctuating on a daily
basis depending on the environmental conditions and life-cycle requirements (Thompson et al.
2015).
For example, corals associated with clade C Symbiodinium usually perform better than
corals with clade D Symbiodinium in normal conditions, with clade C-infected juveniles growing
two to three times as fast as those infected with clade D (Lesser et al. 2013; Hume et al. 2016).
But in hot environments where coral bleaching is common, corals with Clade D Symbiodinium
do better. One reason is that clade D appears to be more heat-tolerant than Clade C, and may
rapidly increase the heat stress tolerance of corals (Lesser et al. 2013; Thompson et al. 2015;
Hume et al. 2016). This can lead to short-term benefits during periods of thermal stress, but
corals dominated by clade D Symbiodinium show significantly decreased growth and
reproduction in the long term. This suggests that the Symbiodinium switch between being
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mutualists and parasites of the host depending on current environmental conditions.
It has also been suggested that things are not what they seem for the Symbiodinium either.
The coral host might be benefiting at the expense of their microbes by capturing and controlling
its algal symbionts (Garcia and Gerardo 2014). Wooldridge (2010) suggests that “the coral host
exerts a ‘controlled parasitism’ over its algal symbionts that is akin to an enforced domestication
arrangement” with “…the coral host as an active ‘farmer’ of the energy-rich photoassimilates
from its captive symbionts.”
Which lineages come together to make up a coral holobiont is strongly contingent on
environmental conditions and cooperation and conflict between different possible partners. This
flexibility in lineage composition allows the coral to respond to the abiotic environment in ways
that it wouldn’t be able to on its own, and is likely important for the success of corals.
Understanding the mechanisms and relations that have evolved between the coral and its
symbiotic partners is crucial for understanding coral biology.

4.3 Controversy about the Status of Holobionts
Several biologists and philosophers have claimed that holobionts, or similar multi-lineage
assemblages of macrobes and microbes, constitute at least one level of organization at which
natural selection acts. Biologists Zilber-Rosenberg and Rosenberg were the first to articulate
what they call the ‘‘hologenome theory of evolution,’’ which they see as an alternative to
‘‘currently accepted dogma,’’ according to which the units of selection are individual organisms
as traditionally conceived (2008: 731). The hologenome is a collective unit made up of all of the
host and microbial genomes of the holobiont. They write, “In the hologenome theory of
evolution, we suggest that the holobiont… with its hologenome, acting in consortium, should be
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considered a unit of selection in evolution…’’ (2008: 723). They are not the only theorists to
have made such claims:
•

“Therefore the holobiont, i.e. the host including all symbionts, should be regarded as the
unit of selection as the association between host and symbionts may affect the fitness of
the holobiont depending on the environment” (Feldhaar 2011).

•

“The hologenome theory of evolution considers the dynamic holobiont as a single unit
for natural selection and provides a more accommodating view of evolution blending
Darwinism and Lamarkism” (Singh et al. 2013)

•

“[A]n organism’s genetics and fitness are inclusive of its microbiome” (Brucker and
Bordenstein 2014).

•

“Thus, the holobiont, with its integrated community of species, becomes a unit of natural
selection whose evolutionary mechanisms are largely unexplored” (Gilbert 2014).

•

“The hologenome concept is a holistic view of genetics in which animals and plants are
polygenomic entities. Thus, variation in the hologenome can lead to variation in
phenotypes upon which natural selection or genetic drift can operate” (Bordenstein and
Theis 2015).
Without referring to holobionts explicitly, philosophers Dupré and O’Malley37 endorse a

similar view about the fundamental entities that are operated on by natural selection: “…complex
systems involving the collaboration of many highly diverse lineage forming entities. This sort of

O’Malley has since moved away from this view, recently stating that natural selection probably
does not act at the collective level in multilineal systems, of which holobionts are one kind
(O’Malley 2016).
37
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interactor, we also suggest, is the most fundamental unit of selection.” (Dupré and O’Malley
2009). Ereshefsky and Pedroso (2013, 2015) use biofilms as a case study to defend the position
that multi-species consortiums can be units of selection.
Other authors have been critical of the claim that holobionts are important units of
selection. Moran and Sloan (2015) state that “While biologists would agree that microorganisms
have important roles in host evolution, this statement is a far cry from the claim that they are
fused with hosts to form the primary units of selection, or that hosts and microorganisms provide
different portions of a unified genome” and that “…some observations that superficially appear
to support the concept of the hologenome have spawned confusion about real biological issues.”
Douglas and Werren (2016) state that “…it is highly unlikely that the entire microbiome will
evolve as a “holobiont” with its host” and that “…the hologenome concept is unhelpful to the
study of host interactions with resident microorganisms…”
Pushing back against recent criticism, Theis et al. (2016) have backed off a bit from
claims that holobionts are always units of selection, but still consider the holobiont to be a level
at which selection acts. They also reiterate that shifts in the microbial community are akin to
changes in allele frequency in the host genome, suggesting that the hologenome is a single unit
upon which selection acts.

4.4 Biological Individuality
I will start with some general remarks about biological individuality, before moving on to
considerations about whether or not holobionts are biological individuals. Accounts of biological
individuality tend to be clustered around a few different investigatory projects. These accounts
are not exclusive, a particular biological entity may be an individual of more than one type.
96

Genealogical individuals are lineages such as species and phylogenetic taxa (Hull 1978).
They are the units that can evolve. Evolutionary individuals are the individuals of natural
selection (Sober and Wilson 1998; Ereshefsky and Pedroso 2015; Clarke 2016). They are the
units upon which natural selection operates and members of a population that has the capacity to
evolve.
The traditional target of accounts of biological individuality is the organism, the
phenomenologically discrete living entities inhabiting the world around us. I contrast organisms
with evolutionary individuals in that the defining criteria of organismal individuality are not
restricted to purely evolutionary considerations. As a first pass, organisms are bounded
individuals that are functionally or metabolically integrated. They are systems with mutually
dependent components that work together to maintain the system’s structure or developmental
trajectory (e.g., Pradeu 2010; Godfrey-Smith 2013). There are numerous accounts of
organismality, many of which don’t agree38.
One other approach to organismality is one that focuses on physiological individuality.
This is a family of views that have developed somewhat independently of evolutionary views
about individuality. Of these, the immunological account advocated by Pradeu (2012) is
especially promising. On this account, the boundaries of physiological individuals (organisms)
are established by the immune system of the host. Other nearby physiological views rest on the
fact that symbionts are either critical for host development, or make something of the host work,
that is, realize or help realize an important physiological function (See, for example, Bocci 1992;

38

See Clarke (2011) for a thorough survey of accounts of organismality and individuality.
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Berg 1996; Xu and Gordon 2003)39. This line of thinking has been important for understanding
the boundaries, health and development of macroorganisms, especially large and complex
vertebrates like us.
I will not discuss the relation between holobionts and physiological individuality for two
reasons. First, I am concerned with starting from a more general analysis that doesn’t privilege
macroorganisms or index claims of individuality to the host. I take physiological individuality to
be host-centric, subordinating microbe individuality to functional, immunological, and
developmental considerations regarding the host. My focus is: how might higher level
individuality emerge out of the general interactions between macrobes and microbes? Second,
much of the controversy and debate surrounding holobionts has focused on whether holobionts
ought to be understood as units of selection or communities, and the present paper is an attempt
to take side in that controversy. Because of these reasons I will limit myself to evolutionary
individuality and accounts of organismality that focus on functional integration of a collaborative
or codependent nature.

4.5 Are Holobionts Evolutionary Individuals?
Evolutionary individuals are entities defined in terms of natural selection: they vary
among each other, their variability causes variations in fitness, and that variation and fitness
effect is heritable (Lewontin 1970; Godfrey-Smith 2009; Ereshefsky and Pedroso 2015; Clarke
2016). The Darwinian population framework is one way to make evolutionary individuality more
precise. This framework has its roots in the account of natural selection articulated in Lewontin

I thank Thomas Pradeu for emphazing this point, as well as pointing out the gap in my
treatment of physiological individuality in a previous draft.
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(1970), and gets its name from Godfrey-Smith’s (2009) extended update of that account.
Building from Lewontin’s three criteria of variation, heredity and differences in reproductive
success, a Darwinian population is defined as “a collection of causally connected individual
things in which there is variation in character, which leads to differences in reproductive output
(differences in how much or how quickly individuals reproduce), and which is inherited to some
extent” (2009: 39). A member of such a population is a Darwinian individual (Godfrey-Smith
2009: 40). Darwinian individuals are units of selection, and as such are “the loci of causal action
for the process of selection” (Booth 2014: 664). If holobionts are to be evolutionary individuals
on an account like this, then they must (a) be able to reproduce at the level of the holobiont, and
(b) there must be heritable differences at the level of the holobiont. I will argue in the next
section that holobionts fulfill neither of these criteria.

4.5.1 Holobiont Reproduction
Godfrey-Smith (2015) makes further distinctions that are helpful for understanding the
generation of new entities. He starts with the notion of recurring structures, which may either be
reproducing or reconstructed. Reproducing things form parent-offspring lineages, whereas
reconstructed ones do not. Reconstructed objects include organs and enzymes. Reproduction can
be collective, simple, or scaffolded (Godfrey-Smith 2009). Collective reproducers include
multicellular organisms. Simple reproducers, such as bacteria, can give rise to more things like
themselves. Scaffolded reproducers rely on external machinery for their reproduction. Examples
include genes and viruses.
An alternative analysis of reproduction, Griesemer’s (2000, 2014, 2016) “reproducer”
account, shares many similarities with the Darwinian individual account. It differs in that he
emphasizes the necessity of material overlap between generations. “Reproducers are entities with
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the capacity to multiply because offspring bear relations of ‘material overlap’ with their parents”
(Griesemer 2016). What makes reproduction different than recurrence or mere production is the
conveyance of developmental cycles linked together in a lineage.
Griesemer and Godfrey-Smith agree that reproduction requires the formation of lineages.
Their disagreement centers on the necessity of material transfer between generations and how to
parse the divisions between scaffolded and collective reproducers (Griesemer 2016). For
Griesemer, nearly all organisms are scaffolded in some way because they depend on some aspect
of the environment for either their development or reproduction.
Questions about whether holobionts are evolutionary individuals—i.e., natural selection
operates at the level of the holobiont—are intimately related to questions about holobiont
recurrence. Specifically, is the generation of a new holobiont the result of reproduction or
reconstruction, which is to ask: do holobionts reproduce as a whole such that that there are
holobiont-level lineages? The answer depends primarily on how the microbial symbionts are
transmitted.
The transmission routes by which microbial symbionts move from host to host vary
considerably and are usually divided into two categories (Bright and Bulgherisi 2010). Vertical
transmission is the direct transfer of symbionts from the host parent(s) to their offspring.
Horizontally transmitted symbionts are acquired from other non-parental hosts or from freeliving population in the environment. The majority of microbial associations of multicellular
animals and plants are thought to be horizontally transmitted (Moran and Sloan 2015). Cases of
vertical transmission are often not obligate, that is, even though the symbionts can be, or even
often are, transmitted vertically, they can also be obtained horizontally. Obligate vertical
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transmission is thought to be rare, and may reliably occur only in cases of endosymbiosis. Many
cases of vertical transmission are really part of a mixed-mode of transmission. Though it appears
to be the case that rates of vertical transmission are exceedingly low relative to the rates of
horizontal transmission, it is perhaps the case those microbes that are transmitted vertically play
a relatively larger role in the lives of their hosts40.
Few, if any, holobionts as individual units are reproducers because strict vertical
inheritance is rare. If the set of lineages that make up the holobiont varies within and between
host generations, then the holobiont cannot be a coherent unit of selection. More select
partnerships between hosts and individual symbionts do in rare cases meet the criteria for
reproduction, such as eukaryotes and their mitochondria or corals that pass along Symbiodinium
in their eggs. High partner fidelity is fleeting without strict vertical transmission. If the
component lineages can all go their separate ways between reproductive events and reassemble
at a later time in at least a semi-random fashion, then there are no higher-level lineage
connecting generations of holobionts.
The only way to draw something approximating parent-offspring relations between
holobionts without vertical transmission of all the component lineages is to privilege one of the
partners. This is nearly always the host, as it is the largest and likely the longest living part of a
holobiont. Privileging the host is nearly inevitable, as holobionts are defined by picking out
particular hosts with all of their associated microbes.
But what if we privileged one of the other collaborating lineages? Consider the human +

40

I thank Thomas Pradeu for emphasizing this point.
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gut-microbiota holobiont with a different emphasis. A bacterium lives inside a doctor who hasn’t
been particularly careful about sanitation. The doctor goes into work and delivers an unrelated
baby. The gut bacterium replicates and one of the offspring bacteria quickly colonizes the infant.
A new holobiont is assembled in the collaboration of the human lineage and doctor’s bacterial
lineage. We can now pick out a new parent-offspring relation between the doctor holobiont and
the baby holobiont. From a lineage-neutral perspective at the holobiont level, this is no stranger
than saying that the parent-offspring relation is between the mother holobiont and the baby
holobiont.
More sensibly, we can say that there is no fact of the matter about what constitutes the
parent-offspring relation between host-microbe associations without vertical transmission.
Perhaps even better: there are no parent-offspring relations between holobionts in these cases.
The related concepts of parenthood and reproduction have simply been stretched too far, and
most holobionts are marginal reproducers at best (Godfrey-Smith 2009, 2011, 2013; Booth
2014). In cases of horizontal transmission, the host-microbe associations recur in each
generation, but they do not reproduce as a unit and do not form lineages (Godfrey-Smith 2012;
Booth 2014). A particular host-microbe association might even be obligatory for the
reproduction of one of the partners. But the reproductive events wouldn’t be holobiont
reproduction, rather they would be co-dependent scaffolded reproduction of partner lineages.
That is to say, they are not evolutionary individuals on this account.

4.5.2 Holobiont Heritability and Holobiont Lineages
Holobiont reproduction with vertical transmission in itself is not sufficient for
evolutionary individuality. Horizontal transmission or symbiont exchange during the host’s
lifetime can disrupt heritability. Even hypothetical holobionts where all of the microbial
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symbionts are vertically transmitted during host reproduction may not be evolutionary
individuals. The second important consideration regarding selection at the holobiont level is
whether or not there is partner fidelity: a stable association of host and symbionts across multiple
host generations. High partner fidelity is a prerequisite for evolutionary individuality because the
holobiont can only evolve as a unit if the host and its symbionts co-occur across multiple host
generations. Only holobionts with both a high degree of vertical transmission and high partner
fidelity will meet the criteria for evolutionary individuality.
Partner fidelity is expected to be highest when there is obligate vertical transmission,
though high partner fidelity might also be possible in holobiont systems with horizontal
transmission where the hosts provide their offspring with symbionts and where specificity is high
(Douglas and Werren 2016). Partner fidelity is often imposed by vertical transmission because
the microbial partners will have a strong selective interest in the reproductive fitness of the host
when their fitness is tied to the reproductive success of the host. But partner fidelity and vertical
transmission can come apart. Partner fidelity is expected to be lower when there are no obligate
dependencies, or when the obligate dependencies can be supplied by many different symbiont
partners. If partner lineages can jump ship, and horizontally transfer to other hosts, then the
different parts of a holobiont aren’t locked into a common fate. This leads to an expectation of
increased conflict between the members of the holobiont as they “pursue their own goals”;
namely, selection for increased replication of one’s own lineage at the expense of the success of
the multi-lineage holobiont. As conflicts of interests among partners increase (e.g., due to weak
partner fidelity), then the holobiont is undermined as a higher-level unit of selection.
This is especially apparent if we consider a hypothetical coral holobiont where all
partners have long life-spans. For example, coral A and dinoflagellate symbiont C are distinct
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lineages that interact to form coral holobiont α. Coral B and dinoflagellate symbiont D are
distinct lineages that interact to form coral holobiont β. If the fates of those lineages are tied to
the success of the holobiont that they help produce, then we have some notion of alignment of
fitness. But if the collaborating lineages are independent of each other, it is possible that lineages
C and D could switch partners. In that case A and D would interact to form a new holobiont, γ,
and B and C would interact to form the new holobiont δ. Holobionts γ and δ survive, and
lineages A, B, C and D eventually reproduce and make it into the next generation of holobionts.
The extinction of coral holobionts α and β did not prevent the proliferation of the lineages
that produced them. The death of α and β might have fitness consequences for the individual
lineages, but it needn’t. In this example, the overall success of the holobiont(s) will have fitness
consequences for the individual lineages that make them up, but the dissolution of any particular
holobiont—because of either partner death or partner switching—needn’t necessarily have
fitness consequences for the individual lineages. Holobionts γ and δ could reproduce as whole
units and still wouldn’t be units of selection without high partner fidelity over the life of the
partner lineages. A high degree of symbiont swapping will undermine selection at the level of the
holobiont because horizontal swapping continually dissolves and creates individual holobionts
over the course of the lifetimes of the individual partner lifetimes.
Yet again, it is difficult to pick out what counts as a case of a new or different holobiont
without explicitly privileging one of the partners. I take this as a likely reason for why the
concept of the holobiont rests on macrobe bias. Microbes are small. Macrobes are big. Microbes
go where their macrobial associates go. Holobionts seem contiguous to us, in ways that
symbiotic associations between macrobe-macrobe symbiotic associations like plants and
pollinators don’t. But this alone does not indicate that they are part of some larger whole. It is
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just an artifact of their size.
Indexing holobiont identity to the host is not without its benefits. Focusing on the larger
and longer lived host makes it easier to demarcate holobionts, a necessity for tracking holobiont
changes over time and in response to environmental changes. Indexing symbiont community
identity to the host is appropriate when the host is of primary interest41. But in the context of
evolutionary individuality, all partners have equal weight, regardless of their size or longevity.
Evolutionary individuals are only picked out by being entities that natural selection works on,
not any physical or taxonomic features. Mistaking holobionts for units of selection appears to
stem, in part, from host-centric thinking, macrobe bias and a reification of operational concepts
like hologenome, microbiome, and metagenome42.

4.6 Are Holobionts Organisms?
So far I have only discussed accounts of biological individuality that are tied to
reproduction at the level of the holobiont. Another approach that has been proposed is based on
David Hull’s interactor account of individuality (Hull 1980, 1992), itself based on Richard
Dawkins’ replicator theory (Dawkins 1976). According to Hull, an interactor is “an entity that
directly interacts as a cohesive whole with its environment in such a way that replication is
differential” (Hull 1980). The replicators are entities which “pass on their structures largely
intact from generation to generation” (Hull 1980). Replicators were originally conceived as an
abstraction of the role of gene, while interactors are an abstraction of the role of organisms. The
interactor is often identified as the primary unit of selection, but this role has also been extended

See (Sterelny 2006) for a similar argument regarding the individuation of ecosystems.
See Huss (2014) for an extended discussion and warning about reifying categories such as
metagenome, microbiome and enterotype.
41
42
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to the replicator (Lloyd 2012). The replicator-interactor framework has since been put to
powerful use in the analysis of the complexities of inheritance and interaction in symbiotic
consortiums (Sterelny 2001, 2004, 2011).
Criticism of the replicator-interactor framework has primarily focused on problems with
replicator transmission and the reproduction of interactors (see for example, Griesemer 2000;
Godfrey-Smith 2009). This has led some to suggest a notion of biological individuality that
maintains interactors while decoupling them from replicators or particular reproductive
requirements (O’Malley and Dupré 2009; Dupré 2012; Ereshefsky and Pedroso 2013, 2015). For
example, Dupré (2012) makes the following claim: “…the organisms that are parts of
evolutionary lineages are not the same things as the organisms that interact functionally with
their biological and non-biological surroundings.” This is immediately followed by a much
stronger claim: “The latter, which I take to be more fundamental, are composed of a variety of
the former, which are the more traditionally conceived organisms” (Dupré 2012).
The move to an interactor-only, or “updated interactor”, concept of individuality is meant
to capture the fact that many multilineage symbiotic consortiums appear to function as organisms
in their environments, while also recognizing that the many replicators coming together within
these consortiums are not inextricably tied together. It is suggested that all that is needed for an
entity to be an interactor is enough interaction between the member parts such that the success or
failure of the interactor has a unitary effect on the success or failure of its members (Ereshefsky
and Pedroso 2013). For example, a higher survivorship in the members then if the members were
living independently from each other (Ereshefsky and Pedroso 2013).
In the case of holobionts, much more needs to be said about the necessary type and
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strength of interactions between holobiont partners such that the holobiont interacts as a
functional whole (organisms) with the environment43. I will examine two approaches to
organismality that may be compatible with the view that holobionts are modified interactors and
biological individuals. The first is an approach that focuses on functional integration through
metabolic collaboration. The second is the cooperation and conflict framework outlined in
Queller and Strassmann (2009).

4.6.1 Functional Integration and Metabolic Dependency
Metabolic dependencies are a hallmark of the close symbiotic relationships that inspired
the adoption of the holobiont framework. A type of biological individuality that emerges from
lineage-forming entities collaborating in metabolism is a position explored by Dupré (2012) and
Dupré and O’Malley (2009).
“My colleague Maureen O’Malley and I (Dupré and O’Malley 2009) have
suggested that the most fundamental way to think of living things is as the intersection of
lineages and metabolism. The point we are making is that, contrary to the assumption that
is fundamental to the one genome, one organism idea, the biological entities that form
reproducing and evolving lineages are not the same as the entities that function as wholes
in wider biological contexts. Functional biological wholes, the entities that we primarily
think of as organisms, are in fact cooperating assemblies of a wide variety of lineageforming entities.” (Dupré 2012)
In their view of the natural world, “collaboration” among entities of fundamentally
different types is essential to all living systems (Dupré and O’Malley 2009)44. Collaboration
encompasses cooperation and competition, includes metabolic, structural, and fitness-affecting

One reviewer suggested that many of the claims about holobionts as units of selection found in
the quotations presented in the section entitled “Controversy about the Status of Holobionts” be
interpreted as claims about holobionts being interactors. I disagree that this is the correct
interpretation of the presented views. At the very least, it is unclear exactly what the quoted
authors mean when they say holobionts are a unit of selection.
44
Bouchard (2009) presents a similar view, arguing that “superindividuality” can emerge in
persistent, functionally-integrated, multispecies communities.
43
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interactions, and involves entities at many levels of biological organization. Dupré and O’Malley
do not discuss holobionts, and so it is unclear whether they would endorse the position that
holobionts are organisms, but their collaboration criteria for organismality seems a promising
option for those wishing to argue that multilineage systems like holobionts are biological
individuals.
Individual holobionts will almost inevitably contain partnerships that vary across the full
range of collaboration as described by Dupré and O’Malley (2009). There are at least two
reasons to be cautious about such a permissive approach to collaboration, if that collaboration is
to be the glue that binds lower level individuals into a higher level individual.
First, recurring interactions, even ones with reciprocal benefits, needn’t indicate that there
is functional integration or active collaboration. Members of a particular host species will
inevitably share similar physiologies, microbial defense mechanisms, and biochemistries
compared to other species. The fact that selective microbial communities with the same
composition are always associated with the same hosts may be due to differences in community
assembly rather than cooperative behavior or a shared evolutionary history. Similar communities
are to be expected across common similar environments.
Second, the evolution of metabolic dependencies or codependencies among host-microbe
communities does not mean that the community, in this case a holobiont, is functionally
integrated into a whole. When a nutrient is routinely provided by an organism’s environment,
selection for biochemical efficiency can lead to loss of genes in the particular biochemical
pathway (Morris et al. 2012). The Black Queen Hypothesis states that this process is able to
occur whenever there are microbial communities where “leaky products” are produced by
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different members that are routinely associated with each other (Morris et al. 2012; Douglas and
Werren 2016). Such processes can lead to interdependent communities without requiring
selection or functional integration at the holobiont level (Sachs and Hollowell 2012; Douglas and
Werren 2016). Mushegian and Ebert (2016) give plausible examples that include protective
symbioses based on secondary metabolic functions, such as detoxification of heavy metals or
plant toxins, or production of defensive compounds against other microbes, which are likely to
be beneficial regardless of whether the microbe is in a host or non-host environment. Perhaps a
more compelling example of the independence of metabolic dependency and functional
integration is the mammalian gut. Mammalian digestive tracks provide microorganisms with all
sorts of beneficial “leaky products” such as warmth, moisture and nutrients. Commensalist
bacteria utilize and may even depend on those resources, while the host is entirely unaffected by
the bacterial presence, by definition.
Is recurrence with metabolic integration enough to infer that holobionts are whole entities
in their own right rather than mere associations of individuals or ephemeral communities? No,
because ecological communities can have reproducible dynamics and predictable outcomes for
their members without being the result of selection, integration or coevolution at the level of the
community (Mushegian and Ebert 2016). Something further is needed to bind individuals into a
whole. As argued in earlier sections, reproduction and cotransmission at the level of the whole
are plausible options. Another possibility is cooperation.

4.6.2 Cooperation and Conflict
The second conception of organismality I will consider is the framework developed in
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Queller and Strassmann (2009, see also Queller and Strassmann, this special issue45), which
takes a social behavior approach to defining organisms. This approach is probably the most
amendable to treating multi-species symbiotic consortiums like holobionts as organisms. Queller
and Strassmann (2009) define organisms as “the largest unit of near-unanimous design.” They
fill this out by saying that “the organism is simply a unit with high cooperation and very low
conflict among its parts. That is, the organism has adaptations and it is not much disrupted by
adaptations at lower levels” (Queller and Strassmann 2009).
Conflicts of interest between the symbiont partners is a major obstacle to holobiont
individuality. Within a single species, conflicts of interest can be suppressed by maintaining
genetic homogeneity in the case of an individual multicellular organism, or high genetic
relatedness in the case of a group of cooperating organisms. These routes are not available to
multi-species holobionts.
Three factors that are important for conflict suppression in symbioses are: vertical
transmission, specificity of symbiont relationships, and little or no dependency on a free-living
state (Herre et al. 1999; Sachs et al. 2011; Lesser et al. 2013). Vertical transmission favors
increased metabolic integration and can lead to symbiont genome reduction and obligate
dependencies between partners, which in turn lowers conflict because the symbionts share a
common fate (Sachs et al. 2011; Lesser et al. 2013). A high specificity in symbiont relationships
reduces the number of competitive phenotypes that a host has to contend with, and reduces the
conflict between individual microbes associated with the host. Little or no dependency on a free-

Queller and Strassman (2016) argue that it is extremely unlikely that any holobionts qualify as
organisms.
45
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living state reduces the chance that a symbiont will have to contend with selective pressures from
two environments, leading to specialized adaptation to symbiotic environments, and increasing
the likelihood of coevolution and dependencies between partners.
These three factors can lead to the symbionts sharing common interests and an alignment
of fitness. The difference between having mutually beneficial relationships and sharing common
interests is a key difference between being just a group of interacting individuals and being a
higher level individual. The open question is: how often does this happen?
We see again that there is a problem when we look at the holobiont as a whole unit. Some
of the host-microbe relations might meet criteria for multi-species organismality, but it seems
highly unlikely that all of the host-microbe relations will be cooperative. Even if there is
cooperation without conflict between a host and all of its microbial symbionts, there will still
inevitably be conflict in the holobiont between the microorganisms. For example, microbes will
compete for resources within the host, including nutrients and space, as well as for access to the
next host generation. The host will remain the site of a whole ecosystem of complex
microorganismal interactions (see Mushegian and Ebert 2016 for a similar view). The idea that
there is a single interaction between the host and its microbiome is an artifact of macrobe bias
and the difficulty of gathering information about all the various host-microbe interactions.
Epistemic limitations shouldn’t tempt us to overly simplistic conclusions about biological
individuality.

4.7 The Disunity of the Holobiont
It is unlikely that there is any holobiont that is also an evolutionary individual or
organism if the holobiont is defined as a macrobe host and all of its associated microorganisms.
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It is not impossible that a host and its symbionts could form a unit of selection, it is just that the
conditions are unlikely to obtain. High partner fidelity and alignment of fitness are necessary.
This is achieved by vertical inheritance or by strong mutual partner choice. Such high-fidelity
associations are unlikely to occur across all of the partnerships within a holobiont. Where it does
not, selective pressures at the level of the individual lineages will tend to put the partners into
direct competition or active exploitation. Focusing on the processes, interactions, and relations
that occur between holobiont partners like this opens up a suite of questions. Does vertical
transmission lead to increased metabolic integration and alignment of fitness? Or are these
necessary before vertical transmission becomes permanent? To what degree are holobiont
partnerships species-specific coevolved consortiums vs. generalist assemblages taking advantage
of leaky products or stable environments? What is the relationship between different biological
parameters: mode of transmission vs. alignment of fitness vs. metabolic integration?
Many of these questions concern ecological relationships. As such, holobiont theory and
research will be impoverished if it doesn’t incorporate the powerful theoretical tools of
community and ecosystem ecology. As we saw with the coral holobiont, holobionts are complex
systems comprised of an array of lineages interacting in diverse ways. Holobionts are disunified
in the sense that they share features of both individuals and communities. Some partner
interactions are best considered as symbioses—ranging from mutualism to parasitism—where
the partners mutually form a part of each other’s environments. Other interactions long ago
bound the individual lineages together into a higher-level lineage and evolutionary individual. I
expect there are plenty of indeterminable cases on the road between ecological interaction and
becoming a full-fledged individual. Holobionts are interesting because they share features of
organisms and communities. Neither reducing the holobiont to a set of pairwise interactions
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between symbiont partners nor treating the entire community as a single biological individual is
a universally appropriate approach.
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CONCLUSION
I conclude this dissertation with a summary of my main goals, and a look forward to
possibilities for further developments. First, I hope I have clearly presented the evidence for
aspects of biological complexity that demand an expanded account of scientific explanation. I
explored how the complex dynamics, stochasticity, and varying degrees of orderliness of
biological processes challenge views that all biological processes can be understood as
mechanisms. I argued that explanation has two sides and paying attention to system-level
features, like robustness, is a necessary complement to decompositional strategies that examine
the workings of the system parts. I examined fields—ecology, cell, and developmental biology—
where this two-part strategy has been independently developed. I also constructed a taxonomy of
robustness that can be used across fields to shed light on how stability in biological systems is
maintained.
When considering complex phenomena, or phenomena at scales vastly different than our
own, it is important to keep in mind how our intuitions might lead us astray. Our causal
reasoning habits have been formed in response to a world experienced at a medium scale. I
examined how the world operates at much smaller scales, and how this gives us reason to be
mindful of our casual reasoning habits, and doubtful about the applicability of our causal
intuitions to the workings of living things at the microscopic and nano scales.
Finally, I took on an emerging debate within biology about the importance of
microorganismal associations and the evolution of holobionts. It has been claimed that we need
further change our understanding of the biological world through an update of the theory of
evolution by natural selection. I showed how—contrary to the claims of many others—
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holobionts are not evolutionary individuals. The ubiquity and strength of microorganismal
associations with multi-cellular organisms requires that we reevaluate our picture of the
biological world. But it doesn’t change our theoretical commitments to how evolution by natural
selection operates. Instead we should come to appreciate ourselves as walking ecosystems and
communities of organisms.
The main ideas of this dissertation are framed around the idea that philosophical accounts
of explanation need to be reevaluated and expanded in order to adequately capture the
complexity of living systems and how they are investigated. The primary task of the first three
chapters was to contribute to this ongoing project of building a better account of scientific
explanation. The final chapter focused on claims that our understanding of biological entities,
and possibly parts of possibly biological theory itself, need to be updated in response to recent
empirical discoveries about the microbial world. Here at the close, I broaden my view and offer a
few thoughts on the extent to which I think biology itself is also due for a reevaluation. A broadscale reevaluation of the status and interrelations of biological theories has plausibly happened
one time since Darwin introduced the theory of evolution by natural selection; it ended in the
Modern Synthesis. There is considerable debate about whether or not this needs occur again in
the form of an Extended Synthesis (Pigliucci 2007, 2009; Pigliucci and Muller 2010; Booth et al.
2016). It is argued that development, non-genetic inheritance, macro-evolutionary processes,
ecology, and the role of contingency need to be better integrated into the theoretical structure set
out by the Modern Synthesis (Pigliucci 2009). To this list could be added the role of microbial
symbioses, lateral gene transfer, and the convergence of lineages.
Does biology need a new conceptual synthesis in order to integrate the current range of
biological disciplines? I am sceptical that it does. Not because I don’t think that previously
115

independent biological disciplines shouldn’t be better integrated, but because I am sceptical that
trying to subsume it all under a general unified theory will advance our knowledge of biological
processes. I have repeated throughout my dissertation that I see explanatory strategies as
heuristics, a set of tools that can be used to understand the world. I believe that biological
theories are much same. Biology is pluralistic, with a wide range of methods and theoretical
tools at its disposal. Whether all of these strategies can be unified under one general framework
remains to be seen. Much of the natural world yields to our investigation as it is, without
reference to a more general all-encompassing theory. Striving for a unified theory works as a
good regulatory ideal, but we don’t need that meta-theory to continue to make progress using a
more loosely connected set of explanations, practices, methods, concepts, models, and theories.
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